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Minimally Innate Ideas 
 
Michele Merritt 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This project provides a detailed examination and critique of current philosophical, 
linguistic, and cognitive accounts of first language acquisition. In particular, I focus on 
the concept of “innate” and how it is embraced, marginally utilized, or abandoned 
altogether in efforts to describe the way that a child comes to be a competent user of a 
language. A central question that naturally falls out of this general inquiry is therefore 
what exactly is supposed to be “innate,” according to various theories? Philosophically, 
the theory of innate ideas put forth to explain human learning has existed for centuries 
and hence, this thesis as it relates to language is discussed. The revival of nativism by 
linguists like Chomsky is thus a central theme of the first chapter. Universal Grammar 
and the various arguments for it are closely scrutinized, and I close this chapter with what 
I take to be the commitments of linguistic nativism, how its proponents conceive of 
“innate,” and several possible objections to the arguments they put forth.  
 Just as the theory of innate ideas has had its contesters throughout the history of 
philosophy, so too have linguists and cognitive scientists rejected Universal Grammar 
and other forms of linguistic nativism. Thus, the second chapter presents several of these 
alternative explanations of language acquisition. Namely, I divide the chapter into three 
sections, Usage-Based Linguistics, Emergentism, and Sociolinguistic Acquisition, as it is 
my suggestion that most of the anti-UG attacks are levied from one of these three fields. 
In discussing the details of each, two distinctions become of particular concern: first, a 
large part of the differing conceptions of “innate” seem to hinge on what is meant by 
“learning” and “acquiring,” and therefore second, a fine line between UBL and 
Emergentism can be drawn, a relationship that is otherwise conflated in the literature. 
iv  
 Because chapter two involves a brief account of the way in which connectionist 
simulations are often utilized to model or represent language acquisition, particularly 
from an Emergentist perspective, chapter three begins by examining this feature of 
Emergentism in more detail. Due to its explanatory power, ability to be effectively 
modeled, and the evidentiary support found in neuroscience, Emergentism would appear 
to be the most tenable position to maintain regarding language acquisition. This 
possibility seems further strengthened when we take into account the neuroscientific data 
often used to bolster anti-nativist claims. Nevertheless, reflecting on the overarching 
concern of the project, regarding what is really meant by “innate,” it is shown that this 
attack on nativism might stand on shakier ground than was originally assumed. Finally, 
based on these considerations, a case is made for an intermediary position, a theory of 
“Minimally Innate Ideas.”  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  
 
Introduction 
The concept of “innate” can undoubtedly be traced as far back in philosophical 
history as Plato, if not further. In the Meno, for example, we find the argument that all 
human learning is actually nothing more than ‘remembering’ what was once known in a 
previous life.
1
 Not only is Plato’s discussion of innateness one of the first recorded, it is 
probably, by today’s standards, one of the most extreme, in that he means to suggest that 
all knowledge, from the ability to walk to the understanding of calculus, is etched onto 
the minds of infants. Thus, as the child grows and begins acquiring these skills, she is not 
learning at all, but simply reacquainting herself with knowledge, which was there all 
along. This radical nativism eventually comes under attack by the empiricist thesis that 
there can be no innate ideas; rather, as Locke claims, the infant comes into this world, a 
tabula rasa.
2
 All learning, therefore, is based on trial and error, observation, or 
instruction. In another vein of empiricist critique, we find arguments such as those put 
forth by Hume, that without any experience or sensory impressions, we can form no 
ideas. Hence, concepts like God, necessary connection, and universality are out of the 
question for nearly all empiricists.
3
 Nevertheless, as the debate between nativists and 
empiricists has yet to cease, we find, especially in the last few decades, a resurgence of 
arguments which seek to uphold something not altogether dissimilar to Plato’s 
‘innateness hypothesis’ put forth over two thousand years ago. Likewise, these “neo-
nativists” have met with their own opponents, those who bolster their anti-nativist claims 
                                                 
1
 cf. 84b-98a 
2
 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II 
3
 Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, VII, See also, A Treatise of Human Nature, I. 
2  
with arguments based on psycholinguistic models and neuroscientific data. The position 
that these new non-nativists are committed to is perhaps not identical to the what the 
empiricists of the eighteenth century had in mind, however, they share in the tradition of 
denying any knowledge, specifically of the linguistic sort, to exist prior to experience. 
And thus, the protracted battle continues. 
 The cursory history of “innateness” given above was not in any way meant to be 
exhaustive. Indeed, it does not even skim the surface of the rich historical tradition to 
which the term owes its fame. I mention some of the major contenders in order to set the 
stage for the project I am undertaking. Based on this rudimentary history of innate ideas, 
I have sketched four distinct perspectives on the matter. These are not intended to be the 
only positions, nor is it always the case that the figures mentioned paid specific attention 
to language, but insofar as it is possible, at least at this point, to subsume language under 
each general theory in some way consistent with other phenomena, the list will provide 
an initial conception. Indeed, it will be edited along the way. 
 Plato, Descartes, et al; “The Rationalists”: The capacity for and all the 
 representations necessary to language are a priori, in the sense that they exist  
 in our minds prior to any experiences, and are known without any recourse to  
 observation, instruction, or experience in general.  
 
 Locke and the Empiricists: The mind is a tabula rasa and hence, all linguistic 
knowledge is gleaned through experience. While there might be predispositions or 
capacities that exist prior to any experience, knowledge of anything, including 
language, is gained by inductive or a posteriori means. 
 
 Neo-Nativists: Something is innate if it provides the necessary blueprints for 
development. All of the principles of language are “hardwired” in the mind of the 
infant at the onset of development, and are therefore innately given. Experience 
merely “flips the switches” in the already prespecified language module.  
 
 The “New Wave” of Empiricists: Neurobiological evidence suggests that the 
existence of any “innately specified” information pertaining to language is 
3  
dubious. Based on psycholinguistic models which are able to replicate the 
language learning experience, it is clear that linguistic representations are not 
necessary for the process to get off the ground. Perhaps a less robust notion of 
“innate,” which would allow for the architecture of the mind to be pre-specified, 
will work, but claiming that all the principles of grammar are innate does not jibe 
with the given data. 
 
This list will be modified as the project unfolds, but for now, it serves as a place from 
which to begin, insofar as it allows me to make one initial claim and to frame several 
questions for further inquiry as well. First, to the extent that we ought to choose only one 
of the abovementioned theses regarding the degree to which language is innate as the 
correct position is I think, misguided. As we shall find, especially relating to the neo-
nativists and the new wave empiricists, there exist data that support both nativist and non-
nativist accounts. Thus, one immediate question will be exactly how are these data being 
used? In other words, if evidence from neurobiology can both support and deny nativism 
(N and ~N), is this really a genuine case of contradictory data, or more a case of utilizing 
data, as well as the very terms employed in analyzing the data, in a manner convenient to 
one’s argument? Furthermore, assuming that only one of the four positions above 
captures the truth might be leaving out some fifth option. Even by the very crude nature 
of my illustration of each, it is clear that no one wants to claim that absolutely nothing 
concerning language is innate, nor does it seem, that anyone, Plato excluded perhaps, 
wishes to suggest that everything about language, from the ability to speak to the 
understanding of wh-movement, is known prior to experience. Thus, some overarching 
questions I hope to answer are whether language is truly “innate” in the sense that all 
acquisition of it proceeds via taking principles already possessed and then mapping them 
onto discrete samples, which would be a rather deductive account of learning. Or, is it the 
4  
case that language truly is learned, in the most robust sense of the term, meaning that 
general principles or rules of the language are only gleaned once the child has 
experienced enough individual examples? Finally, is it possible for the process of coming 
to be a competent user of a language to have both deductive and inductive 
characteristics? Several corollary inquiries naturally fall out from these primary 
questions, such as whether or not any of the four positions mentioned above adequately 
expresses the nature of language learning, if there needs to be some other position, 
whether this position is entirely novel or if it is just an amalgam of several others, and so 
forth. 
 In order to satisfy these inquiries, I will look at several theories which purport to 
answer the question of language and innateness in varying ways. A short glance at any 
one of these will however, reveal the complex ambiguity and difficulty in ascribing an 
exact innate/not-innate label to language. It would be nice if I could say that in the 
following three sections I will look at Universal Grammar, Constructivism, and 
Connectionism, which argue that 1) Language is Innate, 2) Some of Language is Innate, 
and 3) Language is not Innate, respectively. While this statement is not entirely accurate, 
it is not completely off the mark, either. In what follows, I will need to look at not only 
what each theory has to say about how children ‘learn’ or ‘acquire’ language, but more 
importantly, I will closely examine terms like “innate,” “learned,” and “acquired,” to see 
whether or not they carry the same meanings across each argument. In addition, I will 
offer some compelling empirical evidence obtained through experimentation, all of which 
are intended to prove one of the abovementioned “acquisition theories.”  
 
5  
 
Chapter 1: Nativism and Universal Grammar 
1.1 Brief History and Description 
 By now, it would be rare to meet someone who has not at least heard of the name 
‘Chomsky.’ His theories, both linguistic and political, have been groundbreaking. It is 
difficult to avoid his looming presence, and this project could conceivably devote several 
hundred pages to Chomsky’s influence on language studies alone. The task at hand 
however, is to determine precisely what Chomsky’s seminal thesis of Universal 
Grammar has to say about “innateness.” One might easily pass this question off as 
already answered, and indeed, the textbook definition of UG calls it a “linguistic theory, 
which claims that the human mind contains an innate set of principles and parameters 
which guide acquisition.”
4
 We can initially say that a Universal Grammarian holds that 
“principles and parameters” are innate, but determining precisely what that means is 
somewhat tricky. Moreover, the purported empirical evidence for these “innate” 
blueprints of linguistic knowledge is subject to serious questioning, as shall soon be 
discussed. 
Understanding the impetus for Chomsky’s position might also be helpful, as it 
brings into focus the status of the innate/not-innate debate on language prior to UG. 
Behaviorism, the dominant psychological theory in the early part of the twentieth 
century, was championed by B.F. Skinner, who claimed that all learning proceeds via 
habit formation. In his book, Verbal Behavior,
5
  he made a case for language falling 
under this rule as well. Language, just like any other skill, is best learned by repetition, 
                                                 
4
 cf. O’Grady et al (2005). Contemporary Linguistics, Ch. 1 and 11.  
5
 1957 
6  
mimicking, and trial and error. This is because according to behaviorism, the human 
mind does not come equipped with any “blueprints” for language acquisition or any other 
schemata, for that matter. It is only together with the environment that the infant, in a 
stimulus-response type of relationship, can come to be a competent user of a given 
language.
6
 
 Universal Grammar can be viewed as a direct attack on behaviorism, but that 
assessment alone would be too narrow. Certainly, the assertion that children do not 
“learn” languages, but simply “acquire” them presents a devastating blow to the process 
argued by behaviorists to be involved in obtaining language knowledge, but an explicit 
linguistic critique is made by UG as well.  For Chomsky, it became essential to look, not 
so much at the differences among languages, but more at the similarities they all seem to 
share. In his seminal linguistic treatise, Syntactic Structures,
7
 he demonstrated that all 
human languages are necessarily generative; that is, the grammar of every language 
suffices to ‘generate’ all and only the correct grammatical constructions of that language. 
Thus, equipped with the principles of a generative grammar, the speaker of that language 
can discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical phrases, even if those phrases 
are entirely novel. While generativity of grammar was a doctrine shared by Chomsky 
with the Structuralists of that time, he further added that grammars must also be 
transformational, meaning that they have entirely unrestricted rewrite systems. This 
allows for a comprehensive description of the order of transformations, like the ones 
governing productive conjunction. While transformational generative grammars (TGGs 
                                                 
6
 cf. Skinner (1938) The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis of Behavior. 
7
 1957 
7  
for short) have elicited much debate,
8
 Chomsky has maintained that the descriptive scope 
of TGGs is not intended to be extensive; it is limited to describing specific principles of 
human grammar. Therefore, objectors to TGG who claim that it cannot solve the parsing 
problem are mistaken in their assumption that TGG need concern itself with such issues. 
Rather, Chomsky claims, problems such as these are for computational linguistics.
9
  
 The reason that acquainting the reader with Chomsky’s early work on TGG is 
helpful is because it sheds light on the question posed above, concerning exactly what is 
meant by arguing that the human mind comes equipped with a set of innate principles. 
One criticism leveled against TGG stems from the very reasoning behind Chomsky’s 
insistence for transformationality. According the ‘Chomsky Hierarchy’ of grammars, 
regular grammars, context-free grammars and context-sensitive grammars cannot account 
for the infinite recursive enumerability of human language, and thus, to explain this 
infinite production, Chomsky maintained that the grammar of human language must be 
unrestricted. However, without constraints, the argument that language is rule-governed 
falls apart, as does the capacity to show that grammar is decidable. Nevertheless, in 
continuing on after Syntactic Structures, Chomsky sought to demonstrate 1.) how child 
language acquisition can be explained via the TGG model, and 2.) that TGG does have 
constraints, and is therefore, decidable. As was mentioned, Universal Grammar is a 
linguistic theory which claims that the human mind inherits a universal set of principles 
and parameters that are responsible for shaping the language eventually acquired. Part of 
                                                 
8
 cf. Shieber, Stuart (1985). "Evidence against the context-freeness of natural language". Linguistics and 
Philosophy 8: 333-343. 
9
 Aspects of the theory of Syntax (1965) 
8  
Chomsky’s Government and Binding theory
10
 is devoted to detailed explication of what 
sorts of things constitute principles and parameters, but it suffices to say that principles 
are the unvarying and universal aspects of all human languages, while parameters are 
responsible for the differences we notice among languages. Parameters have a finite 
number of open values which, once set, will vary from language to language. This 
parametric variation, or all the possible set values, is not what he argues to be innately 
present in the mind. This would imply that the child is born with something resembling 
knowledge of all the languages in the world. Rather, as Chomsky puts it: 
 We can think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a fixed network  
 connected to a switch box; the network is constituted of the principles of  
 language, while the switches are the options to be determined by experience.  
 when the switches are set in one way, we have Swahili; when they are set in  
 another, we have Japanese. Each possible human language is identified as a  
 particular setting of the switches-a setting of parameters, in technical terminology. 
 If the research program succeeds, we should be able literally to deduce Swahili  
 from one choice of settings, Japanese from another, and so on through the  
languages that humans can acquire. The empirical conditions of language 
acquisition require that the switches be set on the basis of the very  limited 
information that is available to the child. Notice that small changes in switch 
setting can lead to great apparent variety in output, as the effects proliferate 
through the system. [2000, 8]
11
 
  
Thus, to call Universal Grammar a grammar at all, is really a misnomer. UG refers to an 
initial state of the brain of any human, according to Chomsky. The grammar a child 
comes to adopt will depend on her interaction with the linguistic environment, which will 
in turn, set the “switches” to a definite value. Those definite values, or parameters, are 
responsible for constraining the grammar of the particular language acquired, and yet, 
                                                 
10
 cf. (1981,1993). Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures.  
11
 New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. 
9  
regardless of the language, it will be recursive, infinitely generative, and 
transformational. 
            With this brief account of the general theory purported by Universal Grammar, 
we can make a couple preliminary claims regarding the role that “innate” plays. First, as 
to the meaning of the word itself, it is clear that those in favor of Universal Grammar 
argue that for something to be innate means that it is genetically encoded information, 
already present in the brain of an infant, at the moment of birth.
12
 To be more specific 
then, what is meant by “genetically encoded information” is not necessarily a consciously 
available set of rules or explicit grammatical knowledge, at least not in the sense that an 
infant can linguistically represent something like phrase structure to herself. Rather, the 
information an infant is said to come equipped with resembles more a capacity or 
aptitude, than an already given set of facts. This is precisely why it is crucial that the 
Universal Grammarians maintain a sharp distinction between principles and parameters, 
the former being the universally innate linguistic knowledge applicable to all languages, 
and the latter, the specific information necessary for each individual language. 
Parameters are often referred to as the ‘switches’ that exist in the minds of every infant 
and they are set at some neutral position, much like a zero on an integer line, but once the 
environment has a chance to make its influence, they get ‘flipped’ such that they become 
charged, either on the + or – side of the line. It seems therefore, that if any confusion 
arises as to what falls under the “innate” umbrella, it stems from not understanding 
exactly what type of information counts as a “principle” and what counts as a 
“parameter.” Looking at the standard arguments put forth in support of Universal 
                                                 
12
 Or even earlier, depending on at which point in brain development these capacities are argued to exist. 
10  
Grammar, it will perhaps be easier to get clear about exactly what these principles and 
parameters are intended to be and do. 
 
1.2 Arguments for UG 
 There have been and remain to be, several prototypical arguments which comprise 
the core or foundation for all empirical research intended to prove UG’s validity. These 
arguments can of course trace their development back to Chomsky, but several Universal 
Grammarians, like Pinker,
13
 for example, have either added to or modified the original 
claims as time has progressed. For the sake of economy and organization, I have chosen 
to follow Geoffery Sampson’s account of the most central cases made for UG, as he 
illustrates both the original arguments, as well as the more contemporary ones. In a 
highly influential book concerning the language instinct debate, Sampson presents 
several striking blows to nativists and Universal Grammarians alike. Educating Eve
14
 is 
only the first of these attacks from Sampson, and I plan to discuss several of his 
objections to UG, found mostly in his new book The Language Instinct Debate
15
 in turn. 
At present however, I simply want to trace the arguments as he presents them, in order to 
determine how “innate” gets used among the various formulations. 
 
1.2.1 Speed of Acquisition  
Although not the first to point this out, to be sure, Chomsky was impressed by the 
rate at which children acquire their L1. Language is learned remarkably effortlessly, 
                                                 
13
 1994, 2002 
14
 1999 
15
 2005 
11  
uniformly, and rapidly, he says, which is unlike the way other bodies of knowledge are 
acquired. Physics, for instance, “is acquired selectively and often painfully, through 
generations of labor and careful experiment, with the intervention of individual genius 
and generally through careful instruction…”
16
 In another vein of this same type of 
argument, the “word explosion,”
17
 has been used to bolster claims like Chomsky’s, 
suggesting that the speed of acquisition of individual words at a young age is evidence 
for innately given guiding principles. Between the ages roughly of 18 months and three 
years, children “explode” with new words, somewhere in the neighborhood of one to two 
thousand newly produced utterances, many of which they have never heard. Because of 
the ease and rapidity with which all infants achieve this amazing feat, there is certainly 
cause to believe in something universal about language development. Moreover, the 
speed with which children acquire language all over the planet provides evidence that 
social-cultural and environmental factors seem to have very little if anything to do with 
the process, and hence, there must be an innate ability possessed. Insofar as infants begin 
erupting with new words without much influence from the environment-indeed, many 
words they produce were heard only once, and were certainly never encouraged by 
Mommy and Daddy-there is also evidence suggesting that they have an innately endowed 
mechanism which allows them to proliferate words with relatively limited exposure. 
 
1.2.2 Age Dependency and Acquisition versus Learning 
Another argument that deals with rate of acquisition, but adds to it, an age-
dependency, points to a “critical window” of opportunity children have to acquire their 
                                                 
16
 Reflections (1975), 144. 
17
 cf. Woodward, et al (1994). 
12  
L1. As the familiar case of the language deprived ‘Genie’
18
 demonstrates, the severely 
impeded development that occurs as the result of no exposure might lead one to believe 
that the language acquisition device (LAD) is only fully functional before the onset of 
puberty. A contrast between L1 and L2 is also helpful here. At any age, an adult can 
decide to take on a second language, and this “learning” will usually proceed slowly and 
with difficulty. This is in direct opposition to the way in which the L1 is “acquired” by a 
normal infant. In a strange scenario like Genie’s, however, it is arguably the case that the 
LAD is no longer operational and instead, the operative mechanism is more of a 
Language Learning Device (LLD), one tuned more towards experiential learning, much 
like the way an adult might consciously try to learn a new language. Thus, the infant can 
be said to tackle the daunting task of learning a language almost entirely unconsciously or 
without explicit understanding of exactly what she is doing; it just happens. Hence, 
proponents of UG draw yet another distinction, between acquiring and learning. For 
Chomsky and his followers, the proper way to characterize an infant’s developing ability 
to use her native language is to call it “acquiring” the L1. Since this acquisition of 
language is said to be wholly natural and unavoidable given a normal, non-Genie-like 
environment, it can be juxtaposed to other types of knowledge acquisition, such as 
computer programming, a skill that is necessarily “learned.” The acquire-learn distinction 
is another way to argue for an innately endowed language faculty, which is consequently 
only tuned and ready for acquisition during a particular developmental timeframe. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Curtiss, (1977). 
13  
1.2.3 Poverty of the Stimulus 
Perhaps the most often empirically tested claim for UG is the one stating that the 
data with which the infant has to work are severely impoverished. The “Poverty of the 
Stimulus” (POS) argument can be put in this form: 
1.) The actual linguistic environment for the infant is limited in its correctness and    
      is highly unrepresentative of the complexities of the language itself. 
 2.) Yet, all children acquire the ability to use the language in all its richness, and  
       proceed to do so with relatively little error correction or feedback 
 3.) Thus, there is a “disparity between the generative grammar that expresses the  
       Linguistic competence of the native speaker and the meager and degenerate 
       Data on the basis of which he as constructed his grammar.”
19
 
  
Therefore, the infant must be innately endowed with the principles necessary to  
acquire such a system. (Because with the data alone, it is assumed, there is no way 
such a system would ever get acquired.) 
 
 Two components of POS arguments are worth noting here. First, without explicit 
instruction and sometimes even with exposure to incorrect or incomplete instantiations of 
the grammar, the child comes to produce correct utterances, has equal competence to any 
other native speaker, and her language is as rich and complex as the grammar itself. In 
this way, principles such as anaphora, although rarely gleaned from input, and certainly 
never taught, are nevertheless understood at as young as 18-months of age, and produced 
without thought or question once constructions larger than two words begin occurring.
20
 
Second, the notion of error correction and feedback are important as well. You simply do 
not find parents correcting their children regularly, and when this is observed, it tends to 
do very little in terms of changing the natural course of development.
21
 For instance, a 
child might utter Mommy goed to work, and the Father might recast this statement to the 
                                                 
19
 Language and Mind, 102-33. 
20
 See the following section for a detailed description of this.  
21
 cf. Tomasello (2002).  
14  
child: Yes, Mommy went to work. However, until the child is ready to accept that her 
overgeneralization of the –ed rule will not extend to irregular verbs like ‘go,’ this 
corrective recast will go unnoticed and unutilized.  
 
 
1.2.4 Systematicities Among and Across Developmental Sequences 
 The fact that children acquire correct forms, even when exposed to incorrect ones, 
is the basis for another argument for UG, stating that intelligence, specific exposure, 
social situation, and other conditions of learning have very little effect on the grammar 
that gets acquired. All speakers of a given language, children and elders alike, converge 
upon the same grammar, with only minor variations among individuals. Regardless of the 
fact that some children grow up to be nuclear physicists with intelligence quotients of two 
hundred and others attain only minimal standards of intelligence, their grammars will be 
nearly identical. And since knowledge of language does not depend on talent, overall 
intelligence or “learned” skills, we can say that it is a universally given capacity. As 
Sampson puts it: “With other skills, say, driving a car, we find a few people who keep on 
taking test after test but who never get a license; we do not find people who never crack 
the task of first-language acquisition.”
22
 
  
1.2.5 Linguistic Universals 
One argument that has received a superfluity of positive feedback as well as 
plenty of negative response has to do with linguistic universals. There are principles 
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which, although they do not necessarily belong to all conceivable languages, do in fact 
govern all the actual languages of which we know. It is Chomsky’s claim that because of 
the overwhelming evidence this is true, it is an easy leap from this notion to the argument 
that knowledge of these principles is innate.
23
 For example, take the principle of 
structure-dependency, or the idea that rules are applied to strings of words by virtue of 
the organization of the words into phrases.
24
 When formulating a yes/no question out of 
the declarative sentence, The job candidates, who will be in town next week, will stay at 
the Omni, the phrase structure rewrite rule says that the question will look like: Will the 
job candidates, who will be in town next week, stay at the Omni? To get this rule, “we 
need to know not just that will is a verb, but that the second instance of that word is not 
part of any clause smaller than the whole sentence.”
25
 Thus, we never get: *Will the job 
candidates, who be in town next week, will stay at the Omni? Since no child ever makes 
the mistake just illustrated, it is argued that the mind is innately endowed with knowledge 
of phrase structure, such that the child can not only produce yes/no questions correctly, 
but can also work out what sort of question is being asked. Chomsky says that there could 
easily be structure-independent rules that would produce the same forms, but English, 
and apparently no other human language uses such rules.  
 The scope of linguistic universals also encompasses errors. In analyzing errors 
produced by children acquiring their L1, we do not find wild and random mistakes. 
Instead, errors, like other developmental sequences, are systematic. There are some error 
sequences through which all children of every language seem to pass, such as 
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overgeneralizing on past tense –ed constructions, causing things like Daddy goed to the 
store to be uttered. Errors like these might even come after the correct form has been 
produced several times, much to the chagrin of many parents, but then after some time, 
the child suddenly picks up the correct rule again. While errors like overgeneralization 
are universal and proceed in a systematic way, another feature or error systematicity 
prohibits certain errors from occurring. For instance, no child ever makes the mistake of 
assuming that since the placement of the adjective red in I painted the red barn, can also 
be moved behind the noun to say, I painted the barn red, that we can do the same thing 
with the sentence, I saw the red barn, such that it would read, *I saw the barn red. All of 
these above universals are said to be part of the tacit and innate understanding about 
language with which children come equipped; therefore, they never get learned, but are 
instead, acquired.  
 
1.2.6 Argument from Analogy 
 One can also argue for UG from analogy, as Chomsky has in the past. Basically, 
the argument runs: The organ that regulates blood sugar, the pancreas, does not need to 
be “taught” how to do its job; neither do the lungs need to be taught to breathe, the heart 
to pump blood, and so forth. Similarly, the “language organ” works as any other organ in 
the human body and does not need to be taught, but only needs to be triggered by the 
environment to do begin doing its thing. Of course, this type of analogy is only as strong 
as the actual proof supporting its implicit premise, namely, that there is a “language 
organ.” Another tenet of UG maintains that there is a specific language module in the 
brain, and although this claim will come under scrutiny in Chapter III when discussing 
17  
Connectionism, according to Chomsky and others, the language module most certainly 
exists. 
 The language module is also the basis of one final argument that may or may not 
be put forth in favor of UG. As Sampson points out, Chomsky always places humans in a 
category all their own, when it comes to language. Even regarding the infamous “chimp” 
experiments conducted by those like Allen and Beatrice Gardner, ongoing since the 
1950s, “Chomsky is one of those who minimizes what was achieved.”
26
 Even if chimps 
can learn sign language or bees can give directions, these are not sufficient data to 
support non-human animal language. It is unclear whether or not Chomsky intends for 
the exclusivity of language to humans to be explicit evidence in favor of UG. Indeed, he 
claims that if it were discovered that animals, such as apes, do in fact have a language 
faculty, then we would have to allow that apes have language.
27
 Nevertheless, even if we 
ascribe a specific language module to every species with a central nervous system, the 
argument that this module is innate can undoubtedly be maintained. It just so happens, 
according to Universal Grammarians, that humans are the only ones with this innate 
genetic endowment. 
 
1.2.7 Language Mutants 
 In his book, The Language Instinct,
28
 Steven Pinker devotes a large amount of 
discussion to many very similar proto-nativist arguments put forward by Chomsky. Since 
the preceding sections have already dealt in great detail with these claims, it is not 
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necessary to trace each of Pinker’s reiterations of the arguments, as they simply 
reemphasize what Chomsky already said. One argument, however, is worth noting, as it 
presents a more contemporary side of the nativist position by focusing on a recent case 
study, which has been purported to demonstrate both modularity of language in the mind, 
and the innate nature by which this faculty is either endowed or left absent.  
 The study was originally carried out by Gopnik and Crago in 1990,
29
 although 
Pinker’s treatment of it is the most extensive to date, amongst all the nativist literature. It 
centers on a family in Essex, U.K., of whom half the members have a Specific Language 
Impairment (SLI),
30
 namely, the impairment of functionality or inability to control their 
grammar. For example, when asked to pluralize nonsense nouns, members with the 
disability would not generalize from analogous ‘real’ nouns in English. Rather, they 
would create nonsense plural forms of words like zat-which one subject responded that 
the plural of this word would be zacko.
31
 A normal speaker of English, however, would 
know that for this word, you simply add an –s, whereas for words like sas, you would 
need to add an –es, and not simply hold the –s sound at the end, which is what subjects 
with the SLI did. In this particular family, only half of its members were affected, while 
the remaining half performed normally on all the language tests.  
 According to findings like the ones above, the case for genetic specificity of 
language appears to be quite striking. Insofar as the observed family all lived together, 
and yet, only some of them had the SLI, it seems highly unlikely that the impairment was 
a result of environmental or emotional factors. As Pinker and others suggest, the SLI 
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must be a genetically encoded deficiency, one which specifically impairs the language 
module. As well, since no amount of training, ‘growing out of,’ or error feedback could 
remedy certain grammatical problems, as most of the above findings were from tests 
conducted with adult speakers, there is evidence that the impairment is an innately 
endowed phenomenon. If language deficiencies can be shown to be innate, then, as 
Pinker argues, so can normal and correct command of the language.  
 
1.3  Empirical Evidence for UG, Empirical Evidence not for UG 
The arguments in favor and disfavor of UG are not based solely on qualitative 
observation, nor are they strictly theoretical. Often, experiments are carried out in an 
effort to prove or disprove one side of the issue. In particular, testing the validity of the 
POS argument for UG is highly fashionable. For example, an experiment conducted by 
Lidz, Waxman, and Freedman (LWF) takes issue with the view that analysis of input is 
sufficient to explain grammatical acquisition in infants. Instead, they argue that input 
does not contain enough information to promote unaided learning and furthermore, 
evidence that 18-month old infants have command of the use of the anaphoric unit ‘one’ 
suggests that an innate syntactic structure aids the learner in acquiring a grammar.  
 In the study, infants were seated in front of a large television screen and were 
alerted to images that appeared. For the familiarization phase, a single object was shown 
three times alternating from the left to right sides of the screen. The presentations were 
accompanied by a recorded voice, for example, ‘Look! A Yellow Bottle.’  During the test 
phase, the same procedure took place except that two images of the same object 
appeared, one the same color as that of the familiarization trial, the other of a different 
20  
color. (The same image of a yellow bottle, now alongside a blue bottle, for instance) 
There were two conditions within the test phase, a control and an anaphoric group. Both 
groups were exposed to identical conditions except for the linguistic stimulus. The 
control condition was accompanied by a phrase such as ‘Now look. What do you see 
now?’  The anaphoric group heard a phrase containing a relative pronoun like, ‘Now look. 
Do you see another one?’ Looking times were recorded for all the phases with the 
prediction being that the infants would prefer to look at an image that matches the 
linguistic stimulus.
32
 
 The results were as follows: For the control condition in which no linguistic cue 
was offered, infants preferred to look at the novel image (in this case, the blue bottle). In 
the test phase, however, with the introduction of the anaphoric ‘one,’ infants preferred to 
look at the familiar object (the yellow bottle). These findings demonstrate that at 18 
months, infants represent ‘one’ as anaphoric to the category presented in the 
familiarization phase. In other words, upon hearing the phrase, ‘Now Look. Do you see 
another one?,’  infants are able to make the association between the pronoun ‘one’ and 
the category to which it refers, thereby representing a nested concept. Because infants in 
the very beginning stages of being able to productively combine words directed their 
attention at the correct image to which the anaphoric ‘one’ referred, evidence for the 
“poverty of the stimulus” argument is thereby offered. The input that the infants were 
exposed to did not unambiguously support the representations they created, but despite 
the scarcity of information available, the infants demonstrated a rich representational 
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system, one that is cognizant of both Noun Phrases and anaphoric forms at the very onset 
of syntactic development.
 33
  
 Although it would be nice if a theory of language development were as simple as 
an appeal to universal grammar, the objections raised against this position are far too 
numerous and robust. Tomasello (2004), for example, claims that another one is an 
unanalyzed whole “conventionally associated with certain types of linguistic 
expressions.” He sketches a scenario in which a child is playing with a red block, with no 
linguistic accompaniment, and is then handed another one, this time accompanied by 
someone saying, Here’s another one. In this case, another one can only refer to an object 
similar to the original and thus, the meaning is not determined by syntax, but rather, can 
be understood entirely among the context of the situation.  
 Lidz and Waxman’s (2004) response to Tomasello’s objections are multifaceted. 
First, they argue that since another one is rarely used without a linguistic antecedent,
34
 it 
makes no sense to assume the contexts alone are sufficient for anaphoric understanding. 
Second, they suggest that on an intuitive level, Tomasello is mistaken in arguing that 
Here’s another one only refers to another red block. The expression could just as easily 
refer to another block of a different color, another toy of the same color, or even a 
different toy altogether, depending on the situation. For the third part of their reply, Lidz 
and Waxman cite empirical evidence from Waxman and Markow (1998), who find that 
when infants are presented with an object (such as a yellow car), alongside an expression 
like See this. Look at this, and then presented with two test objects (a yellow car and a 
green car), while being asked the question, Can you find another one?, the results are that 
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the infants choose either the yellow or the green car at a rate indistinguishable from 
chance. According to Tomasello, they ought to have shown a preference for the most 
similar object based on the contextual information available surrounding another one, but 
this was clearly not the case. In the Lidz, et al study, however, “infants did hear a 
linguistic antecedent during familiarization and did pick the most similar object at test.”
35
 
This evidence leads Lidz and Waxman to conclude that the infants have an innate 
appreciation of the internal structure of the noun phrase and their knowledge that one is 
anaphoric to the phrasal category is what led them to pick the most similar object. 
 Lidz, Gleitman, and Gleitman (2003, henceforth LGG) also performed an 
experiment in order to show that even in a language which does not use syntax as the 
most reliable cue to meaning such as the Dravidian, Kannada, for example, an appeal to 
universal grammar is nevertheless made, namely via Isomorphic Mapping, or what 
Chomsky earlier called the theta criterion.
36
 The idea is that “noun phrase number lines 
up as simply as possible with argument number.”
37
 Two sets of experiments were 
conducted, one on three year olds, the other on adults. Both built on the methodology of 
Naigles et al (1992) and their work looking at child responses to old verbs in new 
syntactic environments. While Naigles did well to show that an effect known as “frame 
compliance,” or the extension of already known verb meanings on the basis of syntax, is 
what guides young language learners, LGG added morphological information to the 
Kannada studies in order to see if language specific morphology overrides syntax in 
certain cases. Subjects were presented with familiar verbs in familiar and unfamiliar 
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(ungrammatical) contexts and then asked to act out what they heard using toy animals. 
Since transitivity is not the best predictor of causativity in Kannada, LGG were 
particularly interested in cases where subjects were asked to act out an intransitive verb in 
an ungrammatical context. According to a non-nativist account, Kannada speakers should 
rely almost exclusively on the causative morpheme, rather than the number of NPs. In 
both experiments however, LGG found that subjects relied on the number of noun 
phrases much more than they did on the causative morphology, which thereby caused 
them to conclude that the universalist view of verb learning holds more explanatory 
power, even cross-linguistically.  
 In a response to LGG, Adele E. Goldberg (2004) argues that the Isomorphic 
Mapping Hypothesis is far from universal; one need only look at a languages like Ewe, in 
which verbs that would appear intransitively in English, always appear transitively with a 
NP object, or Lao, which allows for special constructions such that three semantic 
participants are expressed by a verb that only allows for two full NPs.
38
 Also, she notes 
that while a causative morpheme implies a causative interpretation, the converse does not 
hold. “That is, while the causal morphology may well have perfect cue validity as a 
predictor of causal meaning, it is far from having perfect category validity (probability 
that the causative meaning involves the causative morpheme): many causal utterances do 
not contain the morpheme.”
39
 Goldberg then concludes that the mappings between syntax 
and semantics must be learned, perhaps via pragmatic principles; in any case, such an 
explanation is at least, if not more plausible than the Universal Grammar account given 
by LGG. 
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 Naturally, Lidz and Gleitman (2004, LG) responded to Goldberg’s objections by 
arguing that infants’ statistics-based discovery procedure must in certain respects be 
specific to language learning and that while pragmatics and theory of mind might very 
well aid in language acquisition, the problem of analyzing predicate-argument structures 
and their multifarious relations to linear strings of words, is solvable only by an appeal to 
some innate source of computational principles. In short, their reply can be summarized 
by the following: “While argument structure itself is not directly available to learners as a 
surface cue leading back to verb meaning, its surface correlate, noun phrase number, is so 
available and indeed is privileged.”
40
  
 
1.4 Sampson’s Reply to POS 
 Geoffrey Sampson presents a series of replies to each of the arguments for UG 
cited in 1.2. Although each response is worthy of discussion, I want to focus mainly on 
his attack of POS type evidence, as it is most often utilized in support of nativist 
accounts. The chief reason Sampson thinks POS arguments fail is that they are logically 
self refuting, but he spends some time challenging the details of the position, one such 
component being Child-Directed Speech (CDS), and its lack of ‘grammaticalness,’ as 
Chomsky likes to put it. He references a study by Newport et al (1977) which found that 
five per cent of the utterances between adults are ungrammatical, which is not significant. 
Given that, as Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981) and even Pinker suggest,
41
 the child 
discriminates between speech directed to her and speech directed at others, then if it can 
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be shown that CDS contains even fewer errors, the problem would appear much less 
significant.  
 Although there is little relevant data about the grammaticalness of CDS,
42
 so 
Sampson’s case thus far rests only on the plausibility that it contains few errors, he goes 
on to argue that POS arguments can be easily refuted by simply examining their 
structure. He focuses on Chomsky’s explanation of yes/no question formation in English, 
as it is one of the most highly cited, in both Chomsky’s own writing, as well as by others. 
When forming yes/no questions, Chomsky argues that there are two hypotheses under 
which a child might operate. (1) Use the first finite verb in the sentence or (2) Use the 
finite verb in the main clause. A sentence such as “What I’m doing is in the 
shareholders’ best interest,” would surely fail under hypothesis (1), as it would read *Am 
what I doing is in the shareholders’ best interest? But, as Chomsky claims, there is 
nothing in the data that would enable a child to choose between hypotheses (1) and (2), 
especially when the sentences contain more than one clause. This is not because CDS is 
devoid of such evidence, but because language usage in general does not contain the 
evidence relevant to determining such movements.
43
 However, as Sampson suggests, if 
we were to obtain a corpus of CDS, it seems highly unlikely that it would not be filled 
with ‘evidence’ of this sort, questions such as Would anyone who wants to go see me 
later, or Could a tyrannosaurus that was sick beat a triceratops in a fight?
44
  
 Regardless of what the ‘real truth’ behind CDS is, Sampson still maintains that 
the nativist position is untenable, as it is based on circular reasoning. Chomsky and other 
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nativists are asserting that language has certain properties, but these properties are not 
available to or evident in the speakers’ corpus, neither spoken nor heard. However, 
somehow, magically almost, adult speakers of any language do not make mistakes such 
as the one above very often, if ever. Thus, there must be an innate knowledge of these 
‘unobservable’ rules. But, even the adults’ conscious knowledge of the properties of 
language are based only on finite observations. We might ask then, what about the 
linguist, who can elicit speakers’ beliefs about language and might have more examples 
and observations than the typical speaker? Ramsey and Stich (1990) as well as Hornstein 
and Lightfoot (1981) claim that they must have access to some of these unobservable 
properties. However, Sampson argues,  
they must concede that speakers’ beliefs about their language derive purely from 
experience of examples of the language: in which case, interrogating the speaker 
does not give the linguist access to any category of data not available to the child. 
 
He goes on to say that if Chomsky were correct about acquisition proceeding via innate 
knowledge of properties, then a linguist really would be gaining insight into this tacit 
understanding whenever he or she probed the subconscious of a speakers’ metacognitive 
capacities, but then again: 
An argument for innate knowledge of language which works only if one grants 
the assumption of innate knowledge of language is less than impressive. [1999, 
44] 
 
According to Sampson, nativists assume the very thing they are trying to prove in arguing 
for innately specified knowledge about language. They then use this assumption as the 
basis for evidence such as poverty of data found among corpuses of speakers and claim 
that experience is insufficient for language learning to take place. While Sampson does 
not mention the experiments conducted by Lidz et al mentioned earlier, it seems clear 
27  
that he would have a similar complaint to lodge regarding them. Naturally, every 
experiment will proceed with the hope of either proving or disproving a hypothesis, but if 
the hypothesis is the foundation for the design of the experiment itself (ie-assuming that 
Chomsky is correct and only supplying the infants with ‘impoverished data’), then we 
might wonder if the results obtained are skewed. Under Sampson’s understanding, they 
certainly are, as the very thing we are trying to prove, innate knowledge, is asserted 
almost as undisputed fact before the experiments begin. 
 It could be however, that Sampson has it backwards. His claim runs something 
like 1) nativists presuppose nativism before examining corpuses, 2) They examine the 
corpuses, look specifically and only for cases of impoverished input, 3) find some, and 4) 
conclude, fallaciously, that their supposition is correct. First, it should be noted that the 
accusation of question-begging methodology is applicable only if the nativists are indeed 
assuming the desired thesis (in this case innate linguistic knowledge) and also ignoring or 
omitting data that would disprove or countermand said thesis. So it is not the fact that 
there is an assumption being made to which Sampson is taking issue; if it were, then he 
would be objecting to all scientific investigation.
45
 Thus, if his problem is with the 
manner by which nativists collect data, this is a different story and deserves to be 
investigated.  
While clearly, the data found in these corpuses are too rich and numerous to all be 
included among discussions of available speech, it does not follow from this fact that 
what gets left out are samples of speech that would indicate something contrary to POS. 
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Furthermore, POS was not a theory that sprang into existence in the mind of some 
researcher who then examined speech to try to prove it. Indeed, as Chomsky noticed for 
example, the language that the child is exposed to does not always follow grammatical 
rules and is often unrepresentative of the language itself, but it was not until after 
extensively surveying the speech that POS was considered to be a viable and testable 
theory about input. In this sense, Sampson’s critique seems to go overboard in assuming 
that the methodology utilized by the nativists is truly circular. Without access to the 
corpuses, I cannot make the claim that nativists are not guilty of pruning the data to fit 
their purposes, but based on the overwhelming agreement among linguists and 
anthropologists concerning the impoverishment of speech to which infants are exposed, it 
is at least plausible to conclude that Sampson’s attack is misguided. 
 However, if the nativist position indeed is in real danger based on Sampson’s 
critique, it will be interesting to see exactly what he has in mind as an alternative way to 
explain some of the seemingly impossible feats achieved by young language learners. In 
the rest of both of his books, he explains the process of acquiring language as 
“Popperian,” insofar as it is guided by hypothesis testing, trial and error, and error 
correction. I will investigate this style of acquisition via alternative theories of language 
acquisition, but first, a few final remarks should be made about UG and the nativist 
position in general. 
 
1.5 Conclusion: UG’s Commitments and its Construal of “Innate” 
 Based on the discussion so far, the original characterization of the “Neo-
Nativists” can be amended slightly. It seems that Chomsky, Pinker, and others want to 
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make a distinction between the state and the process of language acquisition, so as to 
only concern themselves with the former. Indeed, all they say about the actual process of 
acquiring a language is that it sets an already wired system into motion. What they are 
really interested in explaining, therefore, is that pre-wired system. According to 
Chomsky, the initial state of the human mind has blueprinted onto it, all the principles of 
grammar, but this does not mean that an infant is born with representation of JAPANESE 
in its mind. Instead, since all human languages have universal principles, the types of 
representations that are innately specified are abstract, general, and applicable to every 
possible language. The parameters, which differentiate among languages, are not set until 
interaction with the linguistic environment takes place. Thus, it is clear that that the neo-
nativist position differs slightly in degree from the traditional rationalist position, insofar 
as the environment is treated as more of a necessary part of this acquisition. Of course, as 
Plato claims, we first experience discrete objects and eventually can abstract away to the 
Form in which they all participate, so experience is an essential component of learning, 
but we find less of this idea that learning really is just recalling what was known during 
death and more focus on what the mind-brain of an infant is like at the onset of 
development.  
 Nevertheless, the anti-nativist proponents seek to distance themselves from such a 
position which seeks to claim that linguistic representations are innate. But, according to 
the ‘milder’ version of nativism that has been sketched thus far, it would appear that the 
neo-nativists’ claims are not too distinct from arguments put forth by at least some non-
nativists insofar as both allow for innate capacities or predispositions. Therefore, one 
central aim of the following chapter will be to investigate what the disparity is, if nativists 
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are not as extreme in their views as one might have guessed and hence, their position 
might be commensurate with some of the non-nativist tenets.  
 One final point I will consider will be whether or not “innate” is used by 
opponents of nativism in the same way as the nativists use it. The introduction briefly 
touched on this and throughout this first chapter it has been apparent that “innate,” as it is 
conceived of by the neo-nativists, means a couple things:  
1. something present at birth, namely, a specific region of the brain or architecture 
of it that is innately specified to handle the task of language learning.  
 2. a capacity or predisposition. In the case of language specifically, it is typically  
 argued to be a uniquely human capacity and one that is universal to the species 
 
In the next chapter therefore, I will look at alternative theories of language acquisition, 
each unique in their specific arguments, but similar in their denial of “innate” linguistic 
representations or principles, in order to determine if the opposition is well-founded, or if 
it stems more from different conceptions of “innate” itself.  
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Chapter 2: Alternative Theories of Language Acquisition 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 As the debate between Goldberg and Lidz et al discussed in the first chapter 
suggests, there have been numerous negative reactions to the nativist thesis, and more 
particularly, to Universal Grammar. These objections vary in type from explicit linguistic 
critique of Generative Grammar
46
 to an attack on UG against its inadequacy, insofar as it 
fails to account for the plethora of factors that determine how and at what rate a child 
learns language. For example, Usage Based Linguists like Tomasello (1992) have taken 
issue with some of the standard arguments for UG and linguistic nativism, such as 
poverty of the stimulus. Instead, they argue, infants have heard and processed millions of 
utterances containing thousands of types of constructions and an innumerable number of 
tokens of these types. It is this repeated exposure, combined with a general learning 
process extended over a long period of time, which allows the language learner to 
“construct” increasingly complex forms. Other psycholinguistic theories emphasize the 
need to more strongly consider the child’s social situation,
47
 their attentional focus and 
spatial orientation,
48
 or their ability to understand the intentions of others.
49
 Thus, in this 
chapter, I will examine several of these different accounts of language acquisition, with a 
particular focus on what each has to say about the way in which the child arrives onto the 
scene of language acquisition. Each theory carries with it a critique of Nativism, UG, or 
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both, whether it is an outright denial of any “innate” principles, or an implicit acceptance 
of some “innate” knowledge, but a refusal of UG as a comprehensive account of the 
process of language learning. In turn, I hope to discover 1.) what each has to say in terms 
of whether language is “acquired” or “learned,” 2.) to what extent can knowledge of 
language be said to be “innate”, and 3.) to what degree does the theory in question 
preclude UG? In regards to this last consideration, I am seeking to determine if any of the 
abovementioned theories actually rule out UG entirely, or merely claim its limitations for 
a comprehensive acquisition theory.  
 
2.2 Acquisition as Construction
50
 
 Perhaps the most pointed attack on UG has been that it accounts only for the 
“core grammar” available to the child, and fails to provide an adequate explanation of all 
the other linguistic items, such as irregular or anomalous constructions, idiomatic 
expressions, and metaphoric extensions. Usage-based approaches, Tomasello argues, in 
particular, the construction grammar attributed mainly to Fillmore (1989), Goldberg 
(1997), and Croft (2001), do focus on all kinds of usage patterns.
51
 This is because 
Usage-Based approaches see the child’s path to fluency as “gradual, piecemeal, and 
lexically dependant,” as opposed to UG, which views it as structure dependant, “with the 
acquisition of particular linguistic structures depending heavily on the specific language 
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to which a particular child is exposed, and with generalizations coming only after a fair 
amount of concrete linguistic material has been learned.”
52
  
 Central to Usage-Based Linguistics (UBL) is the claim that constructions are not 
rules. Rather than coming equipped with abstract, semantically empty, syntactic 
structures, UBL views the infant learner as slowly developing patterns of use, which then 
can become schematized in their minds as this or that type of construction. While the 
patterns of usage might become very rule-like, in the sense that more predominantly used 
constructions can be more easily generalized, never do they become entirely abstract 
“rules,” devoid of any communicative function. As Tomasello puts it: 
 In usage-based approaches, contentless rules, principles parameters, constraints,  
 features, and so forth are the formal devices of professional linguists; they simply  
 do not exist in the minds of the speakers of a natural language. [2003, 100] 
 
 
We can also think of UBL as saying something fundamentally different from 
Generative Linguistics, in that the two view the process of language learning oppositely. 
Although Chomsky himself spent very little time discussing process, the basic 
assumption of Generative Linguistics, to which UG is intimately tied, sees language 
acquisition as a deductive process, where the child begins with very abstract and general 
principles or rules, and ends up with concrete ways of applying them. Conversely, UBL 
argues that the child is only ever exposed to actual instantiations of language and then 
generalizes over a large amount of data in order to recognize patterns, which in turn 
allows for “rule-like” representations. The representations of generalizations might be 
better thought of as exemplars of construction types, rather than resembling rules in any 
strict sense. In this light therefore, UBL views language acquisition as inductive. 
                                                 
52
 Ibid, 98. 
34  
Likewise, we could say that while UG argues that the child moves from innately given 
types to an unlimited number of tokens available to her in the natural language, in UBL, 
this process is reversed. The child begins with “tens of thousands of types presented as 
tokens,”
53
 and only after repeated exposure, practice, and pattern recognition can she then 
represent the types in her mind.   
 The third and final characterization of UBL involves the method by which it 
studies child language acquisition. Because UBL does not view the directionality of 
language development as deductive, but rather supports the notion that the child must 
generalize over millions of examples, the process of acquisition is therefore slow and 
oftentimes, clumsy. Studying language in an ontogenetic manner, however, implies 
detailed, elaborate, and usually longitudinal experiments. Thus, research is typically 
guided and benefited by the Child Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES),
54
 as it 
provides a rich database of transcripts, past studies, computer analysis, and tools for 
linguistic coding. CHILDES also allows for networking among researchers, as they have 
access to results and findings obtained over long periods of time, such as those of 
Tomasello’s case study of his own daughter, which is a diary filled with one year’s worth 
of detailed analysis. Although I will discuss this and several other similar findings in turn, 
the underlying outcome a researcher would obtain by looking at Tomasello’s data is, 
according to Tomasello of course, that it demonstrates the “emergence” of new forms on 
the basis of constructing from simpler ones.
55
 In short, the methodology behind testing 
the validity of UBL is quite different than that of UG. Considering that the former takes 
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language acquisition to be “piecemeal” and rather lengthy, it should stand to reason that 
the way the learner is viewed in experimentation geared towards UBL will be nothing 
like the manner in which experiments are conducted to prove, that the learner is simply 
triggering already possessed knowledge of linguistic principles.  
 
2.2.1 UBL: Acquisition or Learning? 
 Until this point, the terms “acquisition” and “learning” have been used 
interchangeably in regards to UBL. I have purposely blurred the distinction between the 
two in order to reflect what goes on in the UBL literature. A few examples:  
“Cognitive Grammar accepts that becoming a fluent speaker involves a 
prodigious amount of actual learning and tries to minimize the postulation of 
innate structures specific to language” [Langacker, 2002].
56
  
 
“Virtually all of the formal syntactic properties of grammar are language-specific, 
and therefore must be learned INDUCTIVELY” [Croft, 2001].  
 
“The child acquires constructions by categorizing utterances into their types, in 
terms of the grammatical properties of the utterances that the child is able to 
perceive” [Croft, 2001].
57
 
 
“To understand how children acquire a language we must know something about 
the language they hear-both in terms of specific utterances and in terms of the 
constructions they instantiate” [Tomasello, 2003].
58
 
 
Clearly, it is not uncommon to find both terms used to describe one process, and perhaps 
this is because the terms “acquisition” and “learning” mean the same thing for certain 
proponents of UBL. For Chomsky however, they are entirely different, and while I am 
not advocating accepting what he says about the issue as gospel, I do think he has a valid 
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concern. Especially when considering the first quote above, from Langacker, who says 
UBL minimizes the number of innate language-specific structures, the natural follow-up 
question is, So there are ‘minimal’ innate structures, right? If we can posit any innate 
structures whatsoever, then I think we can still speak of acquisition as being at least part 
of the story of development. Indeed, Chomsky thought that it was the innate principles 
which provided the conditions for the possibility of tokening infinitely many utterances. 
Nonetheless, as Ellis claims, regarding UBL, “In these views, language is learned and 
syntax is an emergent phenomenon, not a condition of development,”
59
 we can see the 
tendency towards a highly anti-acquisitional model.  
 Since it may not be altogether clear at this point, why it is crucial to pin down 
what type of process, whether acquisition or learning, UBL maintains language 
development is, I will briefly explain what I view the significance to be. As I have 
discussed above, there seems to be an intimate link between innate structures and the 
process of language development being a deductive one. If Langacker and others want to 
allow for any innate structures, then based on this interrelation, at least some of these 
“rules” must be represented in the infants mind. Of course, this goes directly against 
Tomasello’s version of UBL, as he claims that no rules are ever “in the minds of 
speakers.” According to the way I have sketched UBL thus far, I think it is appropriate to 
argue that it views language development as chiefly a “learning” process, insofar as the 
“conditions of development” are not language specific, but rely on more general 
abductive inferences. As we shall see in the following section however, a large number of 
Usage-Based Linguists, Tomasello included, concede that there must be some innate 
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principles governing this learning process. For the time being therefore, I will call the 
process by which UBL characterizes language development as “Learning Lite.” Agreeing 
with Ellis for the most part, who claims that UBL argues that “language is learned,” I 
want to make room for “Radical Constructivists,” like Croft, who allow for language-
specific structures. If these structures can also be shown to be innate, this version of UBL 
would simultaneously allow for minimal acquisition.  
 
2.2.2 ‘Learning Lite’ and the Acquisition of Constructions 
 An important factor governing early childhood language production, according to 
UBL, is the language to which children are exposed. However, there exists a scarcity of 
research that seeks to inventory the rich and complex range of expressions making up the 
child’s daily input. Indeed, as Tomasello points out, most of the studies involving Child-
Directed-Speech (CDS) focus only on specific aspects of the input, such as tone of voice, 
with Motherese being a popular topic.
60
 There has been recent documentation by 
Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven, and Tomasello (2003), which examined all of the CDS of 
twelve mothers and their 2- to 3-year-old children, all of whom were native English 
speakers. These were catalogued and organized based on constructional categories, but in 
short, Cameron-Faulkner et al found that: 
Children heard an estimated 5000 to 7000 utterances per day, between one-quarter 
and one-third of these were questions, more than 20 % of these were not full adult 
sentences, but rather were some kind of fragment, about one-quarter of these were 
imperatives and utterances structured by the copula, and only about 15% of these 
had the canonical English SVO form, supposedly characteristic of the English 
language, and over 80% of the SVO’s had a pronoun subject.
61
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Before discussing how this inventory is used to bolster UBL, I want to point out 
that problem of paucity in cataloguing children’s linguistic input has not been entirely 
satisfied. First of all, CDS is only one type of input; children are exposed to countless 
other expressions, from passive involvement in adult-to-adult conversations, radio and 
television, and older sibling or peer speech. None of these can be argued to be child-
directed and as the few studies regarding these interactions suggest, a catalogue of them 
would not identically match that obtained by Cameron-Faulkner, et al. To be sure, this 
appears to be only a minor point of contention, especially if we assume that CDS is most 
responsible for directing children’s attention to linguistic data, and hence, their ability to 
produce language. Nevertheless, the non-CDS input still exists; in fact, for some adult 
language users of other cultures, CDS is an almost non-existent phenomenon.
62
 Also, we 
cannot ignore the stubborn nativist cry, reminding us that regardless of input, be it child-
directed, incomplete, or adult-directed only, children all over the world learn to speak in 
their native tongue.    
 
 
2.3 Language Emerges 
 
 Oftentimes, UBL is referred to as “Constructivism,” or is listed under the heading 
of “Constructivist Approaches to Childhood Language Acquisition.”
63
 In the previous 
section, I used the blanket name of UBL to include all theories of similar type, regardless 
of nomenclature. One theory that also sometimes gets folded in with UBL-type theories is 
Emergentism. This, in my opinion, is a mistake. 
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 The majority of emergentists that I have come across all have one thing in 
common; they are intimately tied to and informed by neurobiology. As a field which is 
relatively young and constantly changing as advances in science and technology are 
made, any theory that is beholden to neurobiology must be prepared for radical shifts or 
upheavals of previous findings. One such shock came in the form of the completion of 
the human genome sequencing,
64
 which showed that there are far fewer genes than was 
previously thought. Indeed, the revised edition of Sampson’s Language Instinct Debate 
duly notes this discovery and utilizes it in a reformulated attack on linguistic nativism. 
Similarly, Elman, et al (1996) and MacWhinney (1998) have argued that neurobiological 
research today does not suggest the possibility of any inherited structures which would 
serve as principles and parameters of UG. Instead, they say, research indicates that 
interactions at the cellular level, the social level, the environmental level, and every level 
in between give rise to new forms. As Ellis (1998) notes, “information theory analyses 
suggest that humans are more than 20 orders of magnitude short of being mosaic 
organisms, where development is completely prespecified in the genes.”
65
 Thus, in 
following along with the current neurobiological paradigm, Emergentists view language 
development more as regulated by experience and less dependant on innately endowed 
structures.  
 Before discussing Emergentism’s commitments any further, it is worth pointing 
out that the characterization just mentioned highlights yet another, even finer analysis of 
the term “innate.” Something can be genetic or it can be inherited. These two types of 
innateness are not mutually exclusive; indeed, it might be determined genetically of me 
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that I have blonde hair, but also inherited from my parents, but they are not coextensive 
either. For example, according to most proponents of developmental systems theory,
66
 
some inheritance is over and above genetic development, hence it is “epigenetic.” 
Epigenetic inheritance or epigenetic inheritance systems (EIS)
67
 are typically used as a 
demonstration of the contrast between the ‘Constructivist Interactionist’
68
 understanding 
of cellular development and a programmatic or preformativist account. On the former 
view, “the life cycle of an organism is developmentally constructed, not programmed or 
preformed. It comes into being through interactions between the organism and its 
surroundings as well as interactions within the organism.”
69
 Thus, with regards to the 
possibility of an innately specified language capacity or facility, one can ask if there are 
genetic predispositions for such an ability, which, based on the Genome project and the 
various interpretations of it, seems pretty much out of the question. Another question 
would then be whether or not language learning can be expressed in terms of an EIS. 
Based on my interpretation of the Emergentist account of language development thus far, 
this appears to be the case, and as I describe below, I think this particular component is 
part of what differentiates them from UBL. 
 Another important component of Emergentism is the correlative relationship 
between the non-modularity of any “language faculty” and the domain-generality with 
which language is learned. Neurobiological research has also demonstrated the 
malleability of the cortex, which, as Elman points out, suggests that specialization of the 
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cortical areas is more likely to be the result of learning than the cause of it.
70
 
Emergentists do not therefore, deny that modularity might in fact characterize the adult 
brain; they simply insist that this modularization is an “emergent” rather than antecedent 
property. Furthermore, the protracted debate over a unique “language faculty” in the 
brain is slowly being won over by researchers like Posner and Raichle (1994) who have 
shown that the infamous Wernicke’s  and Broca’s areas are not the only language locales. 
Neural imaging has shown that high frontal and parietal areas, parts of the cerebellum, 
and some of the subcortices are all valid “language areas.”
71
 And finally, these areas are 
not solely designed to handle linguistic information; that is, they are responsible for many 
other types of processing, from spatial reasoning,
72
 to distinguishing between high and 
low frequency words.
73
 In short, these neurobiological findings lead Emergentists to deny 
the existence of a specific language module at the onset of development. Because of the 
nonmodular view of the mind they hold, Emergentists are also reluctant to allow for any 
innately prespecified linguistic principles. Nevertheless, reluctance does not entail 
outright refusal and as we shall see, Emergentists have quite a different take on what sorts 
of things could be deemed innate. But first, I want to digress a moment, as I think it is 
important to differentiate between Emergentism and UBL, two typically conflated 
theories. 
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2.3.1 Are Emergentists not just Usage-Based Linguists + Neurobiology? 
 
 The reader at this point might reasonably assume that Emergentism is nothing 
more than a glorified version of UBL. After all, it adds ‘super-beefy’ neuroscientific data 
to strengthen the claim that linguistic rules are not innately possessed in the minds of 
infants. With this point of similarity among the two theories, I concur. It is also the case 
that both theories view the development of language as an inductive process. However, 
there are some slight yet significant differences between the two. I will only summarize 
these distinctions for now, as I hope to explain each in depth, as the following sections 
unfold.  
 1.) Cognition versus Interaction: While UBL focuses on what the learner  
 represents to herself when constructing new forms, Emergentism focuses on the 
 dynamism between learner and world. In other words, UBL sees the child as a  
 somewhat passive receptor of the millions of language instantiations and then  
 seeks to understand how, with only very primitive forms available, the child is  
 able to construct more complex ones. Instead, Emergentism views the child as  
 actively involved in social, environmental, physical, and biological interactions, 
 all of which are integral components of development. 
 
 2.) Product versus Process: As the first distinction illustrates, UBL seems to be  
 more concerned with ‘what gets learned’ rather than how it gets learned. This is  
 not to say that the theory of “Constructing a Language” is not about the process  
 involved in learning. UBL is however, more invested in determining how the  
43  
 child arrives at a final state, or to put it another way, how the child comes to  
possess and be able to utilize complex constructions. Emergentists do not view  
language as a ‘thing’ to be learned; it is rather an emergent phenomenon, resulting 
from interactions at various levels. One analogy drawn by Ellis, suggests that  
“complexity of a solution emerges from the interaction of problem and solver.  
Apparent complexity may come more from the problem than from the system that 
learns to solve it.”
74
 Similarly, Bickhard and Terveen (1995) focus on the way in  
which Interactivism (Emergentism) provides a functional model of  
representation. “That is, it presents a functional explication of representation  
(or representing), rather than a characterization of representations.”
75
 
 
 3.) Linguistic Universals: While it is difficult to pin down a unified theory of  
 linguistic universality in UBL, there is at least a substantial amount of disdain 
 for the “convergence of grammars,” prevalent in the UBL literature.
76
 Indeed, the  
 linguistic anomalies found in languages like Lao and Ewe are often cited as  
 evidence that there can be no universal principles of language, especially none  
 that are innately specified in the minds of infants. It is also questionable whether  
 or not Emergentists buy into the notion of linguistic universals; however, if such  
 universality is found to exist, Emergentism is not in danger, as its basic tenets are 
 not based on the denial of such universals. Instead, Emergentists explain away 
 universals as they do any other phenomenon; linguistic universals have emerged,  
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 just as the universality of human transport has emerged.
77
 This universality comes  
 not from a prespecified code, but rather, from the interactions of users, their 
 needs, the environment, and the constraints placed thereupon.  
To summarize, Emergentism is often found in the literature as being synonymous with 
Interactivism, and based on the discussion above, it ought to be perfectly clear why. 
UBL, on the other hand, focuses less on the learner’s dynamic relationship with the 
incoming data, and more on the complexity of the data itself and the means by which the 
child is able to ‘construct’ her own language, thereby emulating her mature-speaking 
counterparts. While UBL and Emergentism might share many similarities in terms of 
describing the initial state, the process of learning is viewed in slightly different ways, as 
I have attempted to show.  These difference have all too often been disregarded or 
ignored, thereby allowing the two theories to be subsumed under the general heading of 
Interactivism, Constructivism, or some similar alias.  
 
2.3.2  Analogies: Emergence in Nature and Beyond 
 A great source from which Emergentists draw their conclusions about language 
learning is the natural world. It is chock full of examples analogous to the language-as-
emergent model they advocate. For instance, the geometry of snowflakes reflects a highly 
complex organization of water molecules, but this complexity was not the condition for 
development of the snowflake. Rather, the intricate patterns and shapes emerge from 
what were once unorganized water particles. Other examples include the hexagonal 
shapes of cells in a honeycomb (MacWhinney, 1998, Elman et al, 1996), the formation of 
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the jaws of the soldier ant (Campbell, 1990), and fingerprints (Ellis, 1998). For all of 
these biological phenomena, it cannot be said that they explain anything regarding how 
development takes place. The hexagons comprising the honeycomb, the piercing design 
of the teeth of soldier ants, and the concentricity of skin ridges on the fingertips are all 
emergent properties. They do not explain development, but are the result of it. 
 Biological analogies are not the only ones out there. Gould and Lewontin (1979) 
have noted the prevalence of such emergent phenomena in human artifacts. Take for 
example, the “spandrels of St. Mark’s Cathedral” in Venice. Spandrels are formed by the 
intersection of two rounded arches, and as they add such beauty when placed on the 
façade of cathedrals or when worked into triptychs of stained glass, it is often thought by 
onlookers that spandrels were part of the architectural design, a response to some need to 
create triangular shapes as special effects. However, as Elman, et al point out: 
In fact, this explanation is the exact reverse of the correct one. The spandrels are 
simply the emergent product of mounting a dome on rounded arches: a triangular 
shape necessarily emerges. What must have happened is that the artist recognized 
post factum the design potential of the resulting spandrels. [1996, 112] 
 
One other case of human-created analogies to emergentism is given by Ellis (1998), who 
claims that the “principles” and “rules” by which we operate can also be shown to be 
emergent. Consider the systematicity with which cars line up at a red traffic light on a 
multilane highway. As time passes and the light remains red, cars pile up, but not just 
randomly and unpredictably. The cars always seem to fall into a lane in such a way that 
the lines are more or less of equal length, but this is not something prefashioned by the 
Highway gods. “Instead, the ‘rule’ that equalizes the number of cars in the carriageways 
46  
emerges from satisfying the constraints of the more basic goals and behaviors of drivers, 
traffic planners, cars, and time.”
78
 
Although these analogies are not the sole driving force behind Emergentists’ 
arguments, they do provide powerful illustrations of similar processes found all over the 
world, and therefore, further strengthen the bond between Emergentism and the sciences. 
A keystone of Emergentist support comes from connectionist simulations, which will be 
discussed at length in the third chapter, but there are a couple other important tenets of 
Emergentism worth noting. One has to do with reformulating “innateness,” and the other 
involves imposing these constraints, as mentioned by the traffic queue above, on learning 
systems. 
 
2.3.3  Learning and Emerging: Is Nativism Still Lurking? 
 
 Since Emergentists are so interested in the transactional feature of language 
learning, there would seem to be little to no room for any discussion of “innate” 
knowledge which exists prior to such interactions. It would also appear, at least according 
to my characterization of learning and acquisition, that Emergentists view language 
development as unequivocally inductive, thus as a learning process. Of course, so do 
Usage-Based Linguists, so it is important to consider again, some of the differences 
between the two theories, in order to determine whether or not any innate knowledge is 
posited, and if so, what kind of knowledge it might be.  
 As was mentioned earlier, Emergentists closely follow neurobiological research 
so as to be able to talk about language development in a way that mirrors human 
development in general. In their book, Rethinking Innateness, Elman et al discuss at 
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length, how cellular development occurs, and citing Edelman’s (1988) work on 
embryology, they divide development into two camps; mosaic and regulatory. In mosaic 
development, the cells’ development is highly determined by the genetic code and is thus, 
affected very little by environment or intercellular interactions.
79
 Regulatory 
development, conversely, is highly dependant on cellular-level interactions. “The 
orchestration of cell differentiation and the final outcome are under broad genetic control, 
but the precise pathway to adulthood reflects numerous interactions at the cellular level 
that occur during development.”
80
 An example of a mosaic system is found in the 
nematode, C. Elegans, while more complex organisms are usually shown to be under 
regulatory control. The point of delineating all of this is to set the stage for a more 
specific argument that there is no “language gene.” As Ellis (1998) pointed out, the 
human species is twenty degrees of magnitude away from being a mosaic organism, so 
too do Elman et al (1996), capitalize on this fact in support of an interactivist approach. 
To further draw a parallel, we can add that as the human genome project has 
demonstrated, there are far fewer genes than we had previously thought. Elman and his 
colleagues certainly exploit this datum as well, by citing numerous examples of how 
genes can be responsible for many forms of development, are not rigidly fixed or 
determined, and can even change their main function over time and through 
development.
81
 
 All of this discussion of the human genome as a regulatory system versus mosaic 
systems like that found in C. Elegans leads emergentists to conjecture that it would be 
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irrational to assume that any linguistic principles are prespecified in particular genes of 
the human organism. It is not however, necessarily the case that Emergentism rules out 
nativism altogether. Indeed, at the end of their book, Elman et al state, “There can be no 
question about the major role played by our biological inheritance in determining our 
physical form and our behaviors.”
82
 Thus, the disparity between linguistic nativists and 
Emergentists depends not upon the total acceptance or denial of genetic predisposition; 
rather, the dispute concerns what precisely, those dispositions are supposed to be like on 
the one hand, and what they are supposed to do, on the other. Emergentists tend to view 
the nativist position as misguided when it takes the fact that there are certain behaviors 
which seem inevitable, language use being one of them, and equates this with a 
“language instinct,” suggesting that all those outcomes are contained “innately” in the 
genes of the neonate. As Elman et al point out, the problem with this conception is two-
fold, having both to do with the mechanism by which behaviors come to be, and the 
content of what is presumed to be innate.
83
 Just because we call a behavior innate does 
not entail an understanding of the mechanisms responsible for making that behavior 
inevitable. Furthermore, positing universality as demonstrative of an innate mechanism 
does not have sufficient evidence behind it. The fact that systematic and universal 
principles of language exist is not in itself proof that those principles were simultaneously 
the mechanism responsible for making themselves inevitable. The absurdity of accepting 
such an argument has given rise to the common Emergentist critique of UG; that it has 
raised the systematicities and universality of language from explanandum to explanans.
84
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 Elman et al therefore posit a broader definition of “innate,” one adapted from 
Johnson and Morton (1991), which removes the language-specificity aspect of the term 
given to it by Universal Grammarians. Basically, “given the normal environment for a 
species, outcomes which are more or less invariant between individuals are innate.”
85
 
This alone does not suffice however, as it leaves one wondering how this characterization 
of innate differs at all from UG. Determining what counts as a “normal environment” and 
an “invariant outcome” are surely problematic. An invariant outcome of human 
development surely seems to be the comprehension and production of language, and 
according to this definition, such abilities must be innate. Likewise, the problems 
surrounding UG also apply to Johnson and Morton’s definition. There are many 
outcomes of human development that could be argued to be invariant; for example, we all 
pretty much believe that snow is cold, that sticking your finger in an electrical socket will 
probably shock you, and that eating too much ice cream will induce stomach woes. 
Claiming that these invariant behaviors are somehow innate seems to be too much of a 
leap. Thus, Elman et al clarify the above characterization slightly. They argue that 
development is the result of interactions within and across many levels internal to the 
organism and that for an outcome to be innate it must be constrained at one or more of 
these levels. Constraints are specified to operate on one, two, or all three of these levels: 
Representations, Architectures, and Timing. While a large part of the third chapter will be 
devoted to explaining the way connectionist models attempt to simulate these constraints 
for emergent interactions, I will offer a brief explanation of each, as conceived by Elman, 
et al.  
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 Representational: if a network had prespecified weights, then it is constrained  
 representationally
86
  
  
Architectural: when individual nodes or neurons are prespecified, the network  
 is architecturally constrained 
  
Chronotopic: if timing of inputs is manipulated in developing a network, this 
 would be an exogenous chronotopic constraint, while endogenous timing 
constraints would occur internal to the network (or the brain), usually as  
 a result of the learning itself, or because of genetic control. 
 
 
2.4 Social Factors in First Language Acquisition 
 Although Emergentism seeks to account for interactions at a multitude of levels, 
all of which are said to be integral to the language learning process, one interaction rarely 
discussed by the theory is that among learner and other language users. This is not to say 
that interpersonal dynamics are entirely omitted from Emergentist models; indeed, as 
Elman, et al and Ellis suggest, the social aspect of language learning cannot be ignored 
and that models that attempt to integrate this crucial element are important.
87
 Despite this 
recognition, sociolinguists and social constructionists demand more focus on the 
language-as-social (LAS) component. The case could be made that UBL, in its rich 
interpretation of the child as generalizing over millions of instances to construct 
systematicities is doing so in a social context. To be sure, all these tokens of language do 
not arise from thin air, but are from other language users. In this light, it is reasonable to 
characterize the child’s learning as parasitic on hearing others speak and that all the 
constructions made by the child are built upon the foundation of other speakers. 
Nevertheless, UBL does not emphasize the social dynamic of language so much as it does 
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the social output of the speakers, and even that research is lacking, as the limited corpus 
of CDS data reflects. Instead, UBL really centers on how the output provided by speakers 
becomes comprehensible input for the child and then gets internalized, generalized over, 
and “acquired.” Social theories of language learning take all these considerations to heart 
and suggest we reevaluate the situation in which the child truly is when learning a 
language. I have summarized their concerns into three basic categories of inquiry, which 
are as follows: 1) How and to what extent is CDS used by the child, and what other types 
of speech interactions are useful to the child?, 2) How are errors in children’s speech 
responded to by adults or older children? and 3) what other factors, such as nonverbal 
cues, play a shaping role in learning? 
  
2.4.1 What do Children Actually Hear? 
Besides involving a change in pitch and intonation, CDS researchers have 
suggested that interactional modification often takes place between caretaker and infant, 
which results in positive effects regarding production. Pine (1994) for example, criticizes 
Gleitman et al’s (1984) conclusion that CDS must be understood in terms of the language 
learner’s capacity to extract and exploit linguistic data from the input.
88
 While this much 
is true, according to Pine, it is not very informative. Undoubtedly, children make use of 
input; no UG theorist, UBL advocate, nor Emergentist would contest such a claim. 
Therefore, “the crucial question is not how facilitative CDS might turn out to be, but 
rather how it is used by the child at particular points in the acquisition process.”
89
 This 
concentration on the microgenesis of language is central to sociocultural acquisition 
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theorists. Instead of a sweeping claim about CDS and its effect on language learning in 
general, the focus is on studying language development at various snapshots and then 
asking to what degree CDS facilitates control of production. 
 Pine cites Newport et al’s (1977) original study, in which they sought to explain 
relationships between CDS and children’s analysis of input. In summary, it was quite 
clear that frequency in general (ie-how often auxiliary verbs are used) played little role in 
determining production control, while frequency of specific factors, such as saliency, 
reduced processing load, and referent matching did. For example, while frequency of 
auxiliary verbs in CDS reflected no correlation with children’s production, the caretakers’ 
use of inverted yes-no questions (Do you like chocolate? vs. You like chocolate?) was 
positively correlated with children’s developing control of verbal auxiliaries. “This was 
taken to reflect the increased perceptual salience of sentence-initial auxiliaries to the 
child, who was seen as having a processing bias in favor of attending to the beginnings of 
utterances.”
90
  
 As the short discussion above illustrates, the social perspective on language 
development takes CDS very seriously, unlike the theories mentioned thus far. While the 
proponent of UG views input as necessary for the “switches” to begin flipping which then 
set a predetermined course of outcomes in motion, LAS theorist argue that language 
development is dependant on the type of input received, is not universal, and is highly 
variable at any given microgenetic stage. Perhaps the most readily cited objection to such 
overt reliance on CDS in determining development comes from studies of cultures or 
societies wherein CDS is limited or absent. A study by Heath (1983) with the people of 
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Trackton, a rural community in the south-eastern U.S. has revealed that children are not 
even seen as “conversation partners” until they can produce multiword utterances. 
Similarly, as Schieffelin (1990) points out, the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea view infant 
babbling as “bird talk.” They not only refrain from curtailing speech so as to be more 
“child friendly,” but speaking to children in any form is discouraged.
91
 In societies such 
as these, CDS appears to play no facilitative role. Nonetheless, the Kaluli children and 
the children of Trackton learn to speak just as flawlessly as middle class Anglophones 
who are the typical subjects of CDS.  
 While UG proponents are quick to cite findings like that of the Kaluli, to bolster 
the claim that there must be an innate endowment for linguistic development, it is not 
altogether clear that they have a sound case. Lieven (1994) points out that in these very 
same speech environments, where CDS is rare or non-existent, children are socialized 
into language learning in alternative ways. In the Kaluli culture specifically, children 
imitate conversational routines, which are explicitly taught by adults.
92
 It is also common 
to find children participating in contextualized talk routines or in group settings, where 
peer-to-peer language learning is encouraged. Lieven therefore concludes: 
The study of child language development cross culturally supports the idea that 
children will only learn to talk in an environment of which they can make some 
sense and which has a structure of which the child is a part; on the other hand, 
children can clearly learn to talk in a much wider variety of environments than 
those largely studied to date. This is…only partly because of the repertoire of 
skills that the child brings to the task of learning to talk. It is also because there 
are systematic ways in which the structure of within which the child is growing up 
gives her/him access to ways of working out the language. [1994, 73]     
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As is obvious, the attention paid to CDS in sociocultural theory reflects not a broad 
determination of the effectiveness of “baby talk” on language learning in general, but 
rather, places CDS in a class among other input types to which a child might be 
subjected. That particular type of input in turn, reflects the society of which the child is a 
part, which is said to shape language learning, as opposed to innate and universal 
principles.  
 
2.4.2 Error Corrections are Uncommon, but Recasts are not 
 Another typical argument put forth by nativists has to do with the limited amount 
of feedback children receive, especially when it comes to grammatical errors produced by 
the learner. Moms and dads simply do not provide explicit corrective feedback when their 
children make mistakes. This fact, although researched in-depth, is easily recognized 
intuitively by anyone who has spent time around children. If a child utters the phrase 
Daddy goed to the store, we would all gasp in shock to hear the child’s mother reply, No, 
son. You have overgeneralized the add –ed rule in this case. ‘Go’ is an irregular verb, 
which means that its past tense form does not follow the standard rule. The correct way 
to say that is “Daddy went to the store.” Again, because of this lack of error correction, it 
is argued by nativists that developmental sequences are innately prescribed in the genes. 
In fact, even if corrections like the one above were offered, claims the nativist, children 
would still proceed by first using the correct form of the past tense of ‘go,’ followed by 
the overgeneralization of the add –ed rule (goed), and then even perhaps the double 
inflected “wented,” until finally arriving at the correct “went.” Input, particularly error 
correction, according to UG, really plays no acquisitional role for the child.  
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 Simply ruling out the importance of input based on the scarcity of explicit error 
correction is misguided however. Not all error correction comes in the form of discrete 
grammatical commentary. Perhaps the most common type of corrective feedback found 
in CDS are recasts. Broadly defined as any repetition of a speaker’s utterance with the 
intent to correct, expand upon, or draw attention to a particular aspect, either 
morphosyntactic, semantic, or phonological, it has typically been more common to find 
research pertaining to recasts in second language acquisition studies. Some examples of 
recasts utilized between teachers and students or native speakers (NS) and non-native 
speakers (NNS) include:  
 
Focus on Form (FonF): Student: Why does the aliens attacked earth? 
       Teacher: Right. Why did the aliens attack earth?
93
  
 
  
 
Corrective Recasting:  Jose: I think that the worm will go under the soil. 
    Teacher: I think that the worm will go under the soil? 
    Jose: (No response)  
    Teacher: I thought that the worm would go under the soil. 
    Jose: I thought that the worm would go under the soil.
94
 
 
 Expansive Recasting: Teacher: What did you do in the garden? 
    NNS child: Mm, cut the tree 
    Teacher: You cut the trees. Were they big trees or were  
         they little bushes? 
    NNS child: Big trees
95
 
Recasts in second language learning are not only frequent, they are operationalized by 
many researchers and instructors alike, in attempts to increase rate of learning and the 
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students’ affective filters by avoiding explicit error correction, which is often argued to 
raise frustration levels and unnecessarily embarrass. In first language acquisition 
however, there has been significantly less work aimed at documenting recasts in CDS. 
Tomasello (in press) does point out nevertheless, that Sokolov and Snow (1994) have 
extensively argued that recasts are quite common among CDS and that these recasts offer 
the child potentially useful negative evidence with which they can reformulate their 
hypotheses about the way the language actually gets used by its members.
96
 This 
evidence flies in the faces of those like Janet Fodor and Carrie Crowther (2002), who 
claim that the ‘poverty of the data’ argument has been misunderstood by critics of UG. 
What is impoverished, they suggest, it not just positive data; in fact the child often hears 
what he or she can say in a given language. It is never told to the child explicitly what 
cannot be said.
97
 Thus, since there can be no other explanation for how the child learns 
that she may have been singing is okay, but *she may being have sung is not, we must 
accept that there are innate guiding principles which disallow certain constructions. But, 
as Sokolov and Snow argue, negative evidence is available to the child. Although the 
question remains, to what extent, if any, do recasts become part of the uptake of the child, 
thereby actually improving rate of development? While this positive correlation is 
speculative at best, the notion that children are exposed to an array of both positive and 
negative examples of the language is central to the LAS model. When children learn a 
language, they are not just learning a set of rules in a strictly linguistic manner; they are 
learning about social norms, interactions, conceptual schemes, and the thoughts of others. 
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2.4.3 Non-Linguistic Cues and TOM 
 In his book How Children Learn the Meanings of Words, Bloom (2000) rightfully 
claims that:  
Learning a word is a social act. When children learn that rabbits eat carrots, they 
are learning something about the external world, but when they learn that rabbit 
refers to rabbits, they are learning an arbitrary convention shared by a community 
of speakers, an implicitly agreed-upon way of communicating. When children 
learn the meaning of a word, they are-whether they know it or not-learning 
something about the thoughts of other people. [2000, 55] 
 
Although the scope of this paper does not permit an in-depth discussion of word-to-object 
mappings or concepts, I think Bloom’s point can be extended to language learning more 
broadly. Indeed, as socio-cultural theorists such as Ohta (2001) have argued, both about 
first and second language acquisition, learning is first social and then individual. The 
child begins by intermentally co-constructing new language with others. Then, and only 
then the child can intramentally hypothesize about forms and rules. The idea that children 
read intentional cues provided by other speakers and thereby learn something about the 
structure of the mental representations of those speakers, which then allows for language 
learning on an individual level, is typically referred to as Theory of Mind (TOM). TOM 
is not seen as a comprehensive picture of language development by social theorists 
however, but instead is one of the necessary conditions for the possibility of language 
learning getting off the ground.  
 Besides intention reading and TOM, other non-linguistic cues exist which are 
argued to facilitate development. Direction of gaze, for instance, is important because at 
only nine months, infants will naturally follow their caretakers’ gaze as well as finger 
58  
pointing.
98
 From a sociocultural perspective, gaze following or gesture recognition 
provides a scaffolding mechanism for the infant learner. The child’s learning is mediated 
through social acts such as pointing, which serve to capture attention, highlight features 
of the environment, or supplement the linguistic data that may or may not accompany 
such acts. Arguing that children follow gazes, and children learn language, therefore gaze 
following aids in language development would be an oversimplification. It is not entirely 
clear what kind of work non-linguistic cues actually accomplish in the grand scheme of 
ontogenetic development, let alone language development. TOM advocates would 
suggest that during attentive gaze following, infants have an implicit understanding that 
whoever is doing the gazing must be interested in some object or person to which their 
gaze is directed. If true, then it could be argued that following a caretaker’s gaze is a 
lesson in mind reading for the growing infant.
99
  Conversely, it could be said that gaze 
following is only the product of an “automatic orienting procedure, either innate or 
learned, that is initiated by exposure to certain stimuli,”
100
 which would mean that 
reading non-linguistic cues has little or nothing to do with intentional attribution. These 
considerations are interesting, but reconciling them is well beyond the aims of this 
project. Suffice it to say that for LAS models things like reading facial expressions, 
following gaze, and responding to gestures are all shared social acts which mediate 
learning. Language is not the condition for this shared meaning; it is rather, the product 
of it.  
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2.4.4 Socialization of the Infant: Why Worry? 
The point of discussing the LAS model was two-fold. First, it provides us with a 
serious critique of strictly linguistic theories of acquisition. Thus, in some ways, it is a 
direct attack on Generative Grammar and UG. It does not however, provide a pointed 
criticism of UBL or Emergentism in a strict sense. After all, UBL proponents and 
Emergentists alike want to account for social interactions. Whether or not they succeed in 
doing so will be explored in Chapter Three, but the LAS model cannot reasonably be 
concluded to stand as an explicit objection to the aforementioned cognitive approaches. It 
merely expands upon certain themes running through said theories. As the well-known 
social theorist, Vygotsky, originally argued that the task of psychology is to understand 
the manner in which social and mental activity is organized through culturally 
constructed artifacts and social relationships, the same is true of “neo-Vygotskyan” 
acquisition theories. Just as humans use hammers, forks, and automobiles to mediate 
between self and physical world, they use symbolic tools to mediate and regulate 
relationships with others. Language is just one tool among many-art, arithmetic, music-
and thus should not be studied detached from these phenomenon, but rather, in a more 
holistic manner.
101
  
The second reason for mentioning the LAS model is perhaps more relevant to the 
overall point of this project. Rarely, if ever, do the terms “innate” and “predisposed” arise 
in the sociocultural literature. Despite this fact, it would be logical to assume that 
principles and parameters are not close friends of the LAS model. There is definitely a 
sense in which language is “learned” under the social framework of development, but 
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even more interesting is that LAS theorists insist that shared social acts provide the very 
conditions for language itself. This would seem to rule out any possibility of innateness, 
when it comes to language. The only thing that could be argued to be innate according to 
the sociocultural perspective, I suppose, would be some type of predisposition to behave 
socially. Therefore, part of the following chapter will address this issue. Specifically, I 
will examine Emergentist theories, simulated by connectionist models, in order to 
determine whether or not social interactions are in fact included in the simulations. One 
other question to explore will be under which of the three constraints, if any, should 
social interactions be placed? 
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Chapter 3: Emergentism, Connectionism, and Minimal Nativism 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 At this point, it would seem as though I have sketched a rudimentary overview of 
the major acquisition theories available, pointed out some strengths and weaknesses of 
each, and then left them all hanging midair. Nevertheless, as the close of the preceding 
chapter suggests, the direction of this project has been ever so slightly moving towards 
the Emergentist position, for three reasons. First, Emergentism takes the bold step of 
trying to account for all the interactions that provide the basis for language learning, 
unlike UG, which simply posits that some innate knowledge somehow interacts with the 
environment and amazingly, kids start talking. While innateness is not altogether ruled 
out by Emergentism, if there is any innate language faculty or representational 
knowledge of grammar, then clearly, more needs to be said about the mechanism behind 
putting such foreknowledge to use. Second, there is an abundance of evidence which 
suggests that Emergentism can be effectively modeled via connectionist simulations, and 
can therefore, stand as a testable theory. As Elman (1996), Rumelhart and McClelland 
(1987), and others point out, when a theory is supported by models which actually run 
and provide substantial proof of that theory, there is much less room for accusations of 
hand waving. Last and most importantly, I have devoted a great deal to exploring what 
happens to the term “innate” in each acquisition theory and I realize that to assume 
Emergentism is the correct story is also to beg the question when it comes to the correct 
conceptualization of “innate.” However, if I am successful in demonstrating the validity 
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of connectionist research providing accurate analogs of learning, as well as lending 
support to language as an “emergent” property of these simple learning mechanisms, then 
it seems reasonable to conclude from there, that whatever we want to call “innate” should 
be restricted to architecture, both in terms of networks and the mind. In other words, 
while specific representations, such as the principles of grammar for example, are not 
innate, the way the brain is organized or ‘designed’ could still be innately specified. More 
specifically, the architecture of the mind, much like that of the connectionist networks I 
will discuss, seems to be intrinsic to the system; that is, the human mind comes equipped, 
not with the representations needed for language acquisition, but with the learning 
system which is predisposed to take on this task. Consequently, this characterization 
which allows for an LAD that is not representationally specified, but nonetheless is 
innate, will not run contrary to what many nativists have in mind when asserting 
linguistic nativism. However, I will spend some time at the end of the chapter discussing 
the problematic nature of such a definition of innate, particularly when it comes to 
denying Representational Nativism (RN), or the argument that representations are indeed 
innate. Based on these compelling reasons to maintain a nativism regarding 
representations, contrasted with equally compelling reasons to reject such a position, it 
might make sense to choose an alternative explanation of what we mean by “innate.” 
 
 
3.2 Nodes, Neurons, Networks 
             The allure of connectionism has a lot to do with the analogue to the brain the 
models are argued to provide. Nevertheless, it remains contested exactly how the models 
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are supposed to line up with neurons, synapses, and regions in the brain.
102
 It is also 
dubious to try and pin down one clear definition or account of Connectionism Proper, as 
it is not a specific theory on its own, nor does it emphatically support one particular 
theory over another. Even more challenging is the fact that connectionism does not even 
relegate itself to one specific field of inquiry; indeed, it provides models which explain 
learning in general, not just language learning, and is thus employed in cognitive science, 
linguistics, neuroscience, and every discipline in which the study of learning is at stake. 
This chameleon-like utility of connectionism does not, however, preclude some universal 
basics. In order to approach the question of whether or not connectionist models support 
Nativism, Emergentism, or some other language acquisition story, it will be helpful to 
clarify these basics and then discuss how they can be used in the specific arena of 
language learning.  
                In all connectionist models, whether recurrent, feed-forward, or some other 
complex architecture, their most basic components are nodes and weights. Typically, a 
node is analogous to a single neuron and like neurons, nodes send and receive inputs. 
Also like neurons, nodes might be responsible only for sending and receiving inputs to 
and from other nodes, or they might receive input from the outside world, and last, they 
might send activation outward. Depending on the network, nodes might do one, two, or 
all three of these tasks. There are arrows between the nodes which are meant to represent 
the direction of either excitation or inhibition and these connections between nodes are 
measured in real numbers, which are called weights. Weights are either unidirectional or 
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bidirectional, and serve to multiply the output of sending nodes. For example, if node P 
has an output of 0.4 and the connection between P and Q is a weight of 1.0, then node Q 
will receive a signal strength of 0.4, or the product of P’s output and the connection 
strength between it and Q. When signal strengths are positive, they are considered 
excitatory and when they are negative, the connection is inhibitory.  
             Input is calculated by the taking the product of a node’s activation and the weight 
on the connection it shares with another node. Since input might come from a multitude 
of sources, we want to know the net input to the node in question, which is just the 
summation or input from all node sources. Output, or the nodes activation value, on the 
other hand, cannot be determined strictly from input, except for in the cases of nodes 
which are entirely linear. In these cases, the activation value just is the net input. For 
other networks, what the node “does” is captured by a response function that involves a 
threshold. For example, node P might output a 1.0 if and only if the net input exceeds 
threshold value X and will emit a 0.0 for all other threshold values. Outputs which are at 
or close to 1.0 and 0.0 are more rigid and are examples of more rule-like behavior, while 
outputs closer to 0.5 represent more sensitive nodes which behave in a more graded 
fashion.
103
  
          Because the connections between nodes are at least partially constitutive of 
knowledge,
104
 architecture plays a key role in determining what kind and how much 
knowledge a network can have.  A simple two-layer network consisting of one output 
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node and two input nodes can easily implement the logical AND, for example, if both 
input nodes are 1.0, or “on.” In a network like this, a pseudo-node, or what is sometimes 
called a bias node might present a negative weight, such that by default (in the absence of 
external input), the output will be “off.” It is only when the net input of both nodes is 
large enough to overcome the negative bias that the output can be turned on. This 
network cannot, however, implement the Exclusive OR (XOR) function. According to 
Elman et al, the only way a network can implement such a function is to allow for a third 
layer of nodes called “hidden units,” which are equivalent to internal representations.
105
 
Thus, the number of layers a network has predetermines the complexity of 
representations it can have.  
              There are several types of networks employed in connectionist research for 
various purposes. In the case of simulating language learning, it is not uncommon to find 
a all of them used for one element or another. We might, for instance, find a feed-forward 
model that simulates phomemic acquisition or a complex model consisting of several 
recurrent models interconnected that simulates syntactic constructions. The point of the 
following section is not therefore, to decide upon a superior type of model for language 
learning in general, but to examine several studies that simulate specific instances of 
language learning, such as morphosyntactic acquisition, in order to determine what, if 
any, type of acquisition theory these studies support.  
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3.3 From Simple to Complex: Emergent Linguistic Phenomena 
3.3.1 Phonological Sequences  
 It was mentioned above that a two layer network cannot implement the XOR 
function, as a set of hidden units are needed in order to make the task of prediction 
possible. This is because for the network to be able to predict the correct output for a 
string of inputs, such as 11000111001, it must rely on both the input itself and the 
network’s previous state. Thus, a network learning the XOR function will have both a 
hidden layer which represents the previous state of the input immediately preceding the 
current string, along with its surface layer that processes the current string. According to 
Elman (1990), what is most interesting about XOR is how temporal structure affects 
learning. When fed input all at once, output is no better than randomly correct; but, when 
given each bit one after the other, the network is actually able to develop memory, which 
enables it to call upon previous strings in order to predict the next output. The network 
adjusts the weights at every time step based on the difference between the predicted state 
and the target output. In other words, the network gets better with experience. Learning in 
this sense is not, however, very complex, since it requires just that the network’s memory 
extend back one temporal bit and the network is only ever exposed to four different input 
patterns.  
 In order to expand upon the XOR simulation, Elman (1990) reproduced the 
model, this time with 6 input nodes, 20 hidden nodes, 6 output nodes, and 20 context 
nodes. In this case, the inputs were binary vectors, each corresponding to speech 
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sounds.
106
 While the input was random in the sense that consonants were highly 
unpredictable, it was constrained insofar as the vowels that followed consonants were 
regular. As the network was fed one phoneme at a time, it could easily predict both the 
identity and number of vowels which would follow. It was trained with 200 sentences 
containing no word or sentence boundary information, but the sequences wrapped around 
so that the first pattern immediately came after the last. An example of this type of input 
is: 
 Manyyearsagoaboyandgirllivedbytheseamanyyearsagoaboyandgirl… 
The task of the network was to predict the next letter in the sequence and, much like in 
the XOR simulation but to a more complex degree, it was expected that to do so, it would 
process the input recursively, such that at Time 2, the hidden nodes would rely on the 
input of Time 2 as well as the results of processing at Time 1 from the context nodes. 
Errors made suggested that while the network might not be able to predict the exact 
output that should follow in the sequence, it could, with great regularity, predict the 
correct type of output. On a global level this means that that following consonantal input, 
error is very low, as the network is consistently able to predict precisely what and how 
many vowels should follow. At the end of a vowel sequence, however, error is high, as 
the network cannot predict with accuracy the correct consonant to follow. Thus, on this 
level, the network has learned to abstract orthographic sequential probabilities up until 
the boundary of a word is reached at which point, error shoots back up.
107
 Nevertheless, 
since error at the global level is the sum squared error over all six bits of input, an 
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examination of error at the bit level shows us something more interesting. While the 
network cannot know with certainty which consonant follows, it can know that a 
consonant follows. It therefore moved from processing surface regularities to processing 
more abstract categories, such as “consonant,” “vowel,” “bound morpheme,” and so on. 
However, these linguistic constraints were not in any way programmed into the original 
architecture of the network. They simply emerged as learning took place. Even more 
fascinating is that in contrast with the XOR function, the phonological sequences are 
longer, depend more on temporal context, and are 6-bit rather than 1-bit vectors. In short, 
this task should have been harder for the network,
108
 as the complexity of the sequential 
dependencies might have confounded or even overloaded the processing capacity. But, as 
Elman points out, “The fact that there are subregularities (at the level of individual bit 
patterns) enables the network to make partial predictions, even in cases where complete 
prediction is not possible.”
109
  
 
 
3.3.2 Word Order 
  Elman also explores the constraints placed on word order in sentences. It has 
long been argued that word order cannot be accounted for linearly, or, as Chomsky puts 
it, there must be a “deep structure” underlying surface structure which allows for such 
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constraints on sentential organization.
110
 Nevertheless, the language learner is not directly 
exposed to the abstract order, but rather has visible and audible access to surface strings. 
The deep structure is cued by the surface forms and is therefore implicit in them.
111
 Thus, 
in order to reconstruct the abstract structure from the surface form, it would seem that a 
certain amount of innate knowledge is required, perhaps a symbolic knowledge that 
extends beyond the capacity of nonsymbolic connectionist models. However, if a 
network can learn the abstract structure, even if no elements of that structure were 
available in the input (ie-the network is given strictly surface cues), then this latter 
assumption might appear questionable.  
 Elman trained a recurrent network on strings of words from a sentence generator, 
which produced random two- and three-word sentences from a template, consisting of 29 
lexical items from 13 classes of Nouns and Verbs. One entire sequence was composed of 
27,354 31-bit vectors, and each word was input one at a time. Training involved cluster 
analyzing the network’s ability to predict the 31-bit vector equivalent to the next word in 
the string after six complete passes through the sequence. This analysis showed that the 
representations the network had formed across its hidden unit activations corresponded to 
major categories of words. The category structure was hierarchical, insofar as “mouse” 
belonged to the class of small animals, but also to the non-human, animate, and finally, 
noun classes. This hierarchy was also implicit and graded, such that while some 
categories are very distinct, and thus far apart from one another in the hidden unit 
activation space, other categories might share properties, leaving the boundaries between 
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them blurred. Membership in a category can therefore range from clearly demarcated to 
marginal.  
 Perhaps the most noteworthy point to take away from Elman’s network is that it 
was able to move from processing surface regularities to representing a more abstract 
structure, but without any syntactic or linguistic rules built into the original architecture. 
The network was also not provided with any real world information or semantic cues, 
which means in a sense, according to Elman, “the network has much less information to 
work with than is available to real language learners.”
112
 Because the architectural 
constraints were general and yet, the network grew to represent linguistic-specific 
constraints, it would make sense to say that these latter constraints “emerged” during 
learning. Ellis (1998) is quick to presume as much, arguing that models such as Elman’s 
provide the psychological model to support the theory of Emergentism. Linguistic 
regularities emerged out of a simple learning algorithm, which is analogous to the way 
language emerges as a result of the interactions in the brain of the language learning 
child.  
 One must take caution however, as Finch and Chater (1994)
113
 suggest, in simply 
inferring from a simple model to the overall reality of language acquisition. A simulation 
similar to Elman’s conducted by Chater and Conkey (1994) showed that recurrent 
networks which rely solely on prediction, become “extremely inefficient and slow” as the 
language grows in complexity. Furthermore, statistical information seems to be limited as 
far as providing decidability among grammars. As we recall, Elman’s network, along 
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with that of Chater and Conkey, were not exposed to real-world stimuli (the networks 
obviously could not hear or see, etc), which means that negative evidence was entirely 
left out of the input. I have pointed out in the previous chapters that exposing children to 
‘what not to say’ is a crucial factor in acquisition and Finch and Chater want to suggest 
that it is the only way a learner can disconfirm the plausibility of a grammar. Positive 
evidence alone will never entirely rule out one string of words over another, they argue, 
and therefore:  
while the use of statistical information in place of negative evidence is 
attractive in principle, its practical application is very difficult because the 
space of possible grammars is so vast. Thus strong innate constraints on 
the nature of language may still be necessary to explain how language is 
acquired. (1994, 319) 
 
 3.3.3 Lexical Semantics 
 In a somewhat different simulation, Landauer and Dumais (1997) trained a 
network to recognize word patterns from reading texts. The Latent Semantic Analysis 
(LSA) model, although a purely mathematical simulation, was employed to solve the 
problem of “excessive learning,” or the fact that people seem to know a lot more than 
what is contained in the information to which they are exposed.
114
 In particular, the 
amount of vocabulary children acquire by high school is astounding, considering that 
only a small fraction of that number is found in everyday speech. Quite clearly, children 
learn the meanings of many words through reading, but it is not exactly clear how. Most 
experiments conducted to date, in which children read and reread paragraphs and are 
tested on the vocabulary therein, find that new words are acquired at a rate of about 2.5 
per day. However, as Landauer and Dumais point out, simple math will show us that if 
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the average total vocabulary of 20-year olds is somewhere between 40,000 and 100,000 
words, then on average, 7-15 words must be added daily. Between fifth and eighth 
grades, they suggest, the rate is closer to 10-15 new words a day.
115
  
 The LSA is described conceptually by Landauer and Dumais as “a simple but 
rather large three-layered neural net. It has a Layer 1 node for every word type (event 
type), a Layer 3 node for every text window (context or episode) ever encountered, 
several hundred Layer 2 nodes, and complete connectivity between Layers 1 and 2 and 
between Layers 2 and 3.”
116
 Since the model was intended to simulate young children’s 
learning of vocabulary from text, sample paragraphs were taken from Grolier’s Academic 
American Encyclopedia,
117
 the words were analyzed by Singular Value Decomposition, 
(SVD)
118
 and the text data were cast into a complex matrix, the cells of which marked the 
frequency word types appearing in the text sample. Simply put, the model was trained to 
treat words as similar if they co-occurred with the same words over and over again in 
various contexts. Training consisted of exposure to 30,000 text samples from the 
Encyclopedia.  
 In order to test the model’s word knowledge after training, Landauer and Dumais 
administered a portion of the TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language), which 
focused on synonyms. Typically, the TOEFL section on reading will contain 30-40 
questions, about 30% of those being synonym questions, and the listening section will be 
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about the same length, with only 20% of the questions relating to vocabulary. Thus, 
roughly 15-17 questions on the TOEFL will deal with synonyms. The model scored 
64.4% of these questions correct. By comparison, the average score of a sample of non-
native English speaking applicants to U.S. colleges is 64.5%, which is a score suitable for 
admission. Based on these results, the model can be said to closely mimic the proficiency 
and behavior of intermediate-level English readers. What is perhaps even more 
noteworthy is that LSA achieved this status by “using text samples whose initial 
representation was simply a ‘bag of words’; that is, all the information from word order 
was ignored, and there was, therefore, no explicit use of grammar or syntax.”
119
 The 
model was also unable to make use of phonology, morphology, orthography, or any other 
real-world information, as it was devoid of sensory-motor capacity. To Ellis and other 
Emergentists, this simulation arguably demonstrates that lexical semantic acquisition can 
“emerge” simply from the analysis of word co-occurrence.
120
 
 However, it must also be kept in mind that the network was only trained on 
synonyms. It did not have to learn all the other skills relevant to the TOEFL-recognizing 
coherence patterns, inferences, writing essays, etc-and thus, its score reflects its 
performance on an isolated task. While it is true that the average score for admittance into 
college for an ESL student is about 80 points out of 120 (66.67%) and the network 
achieved close to this performance rate, it would be a far cry to assume then that the 
network is as good at English as an international student who has just successfully passed 
the entire TOEFL. Sixty-six percent is considered a strong score when all four 
components-reading, speaking, listening, and writing-are tested over a 3.5 hour period. 
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Sixty-six percent on a single set of synonyms after much training seems far less 
impressive.  
 
3.3.4  Morphosyntactic Acquisition 
 Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) were the first to simulate the acquisition of 
inflectional morphology which subsequently has paved the way for several other 
compelling, if not controversial simulations of a similar type. Morphosyntactic 
acquisition is unique in that it builds upon processes of acquisition discussed above, such 
as phonological sequencing, which itself generates letter and word sequences (-ed, -ing, -
s, etc) that provide cues to tense, case, number of referents, and so forth. Perhaps one of 
the most fascinating aspects of early childhood morphological acquisition is the 
overwhelming tendency to overgeneralize, such as the infamous case of –ed marking the 
past tense for every verb, including irregulars, resulting in constructions such as Mommy 
goed to the store.  
 The original simulation conducted by Rumelhart and McClelland which used a 
simple recurrent “pattern associator”
121
 was designed to mimic this particular behavior 
common to young children, what is known as the U-shaped learning curve.
122
 It was also 
intended to capture the aspects of varying performance on different types of regular and 
irregular verbs. Bybee and Slobin (1982) catalogued nine different types of irregular 
verbs and three different regulars; for example, Type I irregulars, where forming the past 
involves no change whatsoever (beat/beat, hit/hit), versus Type VIII irregulars such as 
grow, whose past tense form grew involves a vowel change and a dipthongal ending 
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sequence. Thus, for Rumelhart and McClelland, their task was to simulate findings 
similar to Kucazj’s (1978), which show that children perform with much more accuracy 
when forming the past tense of Type I verbs, but tend to overgeneralize and use the 
past+ed construction for Type VIII verbs. After a training sequence, the pattern 
associator model had successfully simulated these two aspects of morphosyntactic 
acquisition; it began by accurately forming the past tense of the “easier” types of irregular 
verbs, but overgeneralized the rule of +ed for regular verbs, so that its initial responses 
involved outputs such as “wented.” As training proceeded, the model produced more and 
more correct forms, progressing through the three-stage learning curve through which 
Kucazj and others have shown children progress.  
 The third and final aspect the pattern associator was intended to capture was the 
ability to respond correctly to unfamiliar verbs. Rumelhart and McClelland found that: 
On no occasion does the model assign a strength greater than, 2 an incorrect 
variant of the past tense. Thus, the model has clearly learned the substructure of 
the regular correspondence and adds the correct variant to all different types of 
base forms. These results clearly demonstrate that the model acts in accordance 
with the regular pattern for English verbs and that it can apply this pattern with a 
high level of success to novel as well as familiar verbs. [1986, 263] 
 
Of course, there were rather surprising responses given, such as changing squat to 
squawked, or implementing the past+ed form of seven of the irregular verbs. They 
speculate that children and adults make similar errors, although the literature to date does 
not support such a claim.
123
 Nonetheless, the model performed with greater-than-
expected accuracy, thereby capturing the aspect of acquisition which involves dealing 
with novel verbs. 
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 Rumelhart and McClelland’s study sparked much criticism,
124
 but it also paved 
the way for some significant improvements in connectionist modeling of the past tense, 
simulations which either build upon or add to the original. For example, Ellis and 
Schmidt (1997), et al “have closely simulated the error patterns, profiles of acquisition, 
differential difficulties, false-friends effects, reaction times for production, and 
interactions of regularity and frequency that are found in human learners, as well as 
acquiring default case allowing generalization of “wug” tests.”
125
 Like the original 
simulation by Rumelhart and McClelland, these current connectionist explorations 
support a view of acquisition of past tense morphology as the result of associative 
learning principles that use optimal inference to abstract regularities. Sequence analysis, 
for example, between phonological form of lemma and phonological form of inflected 
form, leads to correctly formed surface strings, both morphologically and syntactically. 
However, these patterns of association are never programmed into the models; they 
emerge through training and repeated exposure to regularities in the input.  
 
3.3.5   Syntactic Constructions  
 Nativists draw a large amount of support for their claims from data which show 
children’s ability to use syntactic frames as reliable cues to word meanings. For example, 
Landau, Smith, and Jones (1992) found that when children are presented with a novel 
word like “xerillium” within a phrase such as Give me the xerillium one, not the red one, 
they treated “xerillium” as a color word. Or, as MacWhinney points out, if we ask a child 
to “repulsate” the tub with water, they will inevitably take “repulsate” to be similar in 
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meaning to the verb “fill” that has as its goal, a direct object, and a transferred object in 
an indirect instrumental phrase.
126
 Findings such as these, argues the nativist, suggest an 
innate and tacit understanding of the role syntax plays, as the input is far too 
impoverished for such knowledge to be imparted.  
 Connectionist models nevertheless suggest something quite different about how 
syntactic constructions are learned. MacWhinney (1997) developed a network intended to 
simulate the abstraction of regularities based on surface cues. When presented with a 
sentence such as The girl eats the apples, there are several cues, some stronger than 
others, which direct the learners’ attention to form and meaning. For example, the 
morphological marking –s on eats, cues one to the agreement between the singular girl 
and eats, rather than apples and eats. MacWhinney used cues such as these for the input 
layer and for the output layer used nodes representing functional interpretations such as 
topicality, definiteness, and perspective. Hidden unit activations allowed for associations 
to be made among all the various input and output nodes.  
 
3.4  Connectionism and Emergentism: Two ways of saying the same thing? 
 
 So far, I have painted Emergentism in much more flattering light than any 
Nativist or even Constructivist accounts. As the second chapter showed us, there are 
analogous examples of emergent phenomena found in the natural world as well as among 
human artifacts. Besides the abundant examples available in nature and elsewhere that 
endorse an emergent theory, there are also, as we have seen, numerous reasons to reject a 
UG-type approach. In particular, UG is limited in its explanatory power; it is not that the 
theory offers nothing in terms of linguistic explanation, but more that it only describes the 
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linguistic element to language and really provides very little in terms of the process of 
acquisition itself. As Goldberg (1995) and others have attested, we ought to focus more 
on the Language Acquisition Process (LAP) than the device or mechanism (LAD). While 
Chomsky and his followers would have us focus on a specific module or “language 
organ” that is said to come equipped with all the necessary blueprints for language 
acquisition, Emergentists suggest that explaining and understanding this ‘initial state,’ 
although an interesting and important endeavor, is dubious at best. We can reap more, 
says the Emergentist, from attempting to explain what actually goes on once language 
learning begins.  
 The negative evidence against nativism coupled with positive examples of 
emergent phenomena as analogies to language acquisition are further strengthened by the 
fact that it is possible to create working models of Emergentism. As the previous sections 
have just illustrated, Connectionism provides us with simulations for many aspects of 
language learning, including but not limited to phonological acquisition, lexical-syntactic 
acquisition, and morphosyntactic acquisition. This is not to say that simply because we 
build a model of a theory it gives the theory viability over and above others. Quite 
clearly, a model of UG might be constructed and for all intents and purposes, it might 
work very well. There are however, two elements that I think separate the above 
connectionist models from other types of models. First, their analogous nature to the 
human brain, albeit not an exact one-to-one relationship, offers a strong parallel, one that 
is useful not only because the models actually work, but also because they purport to 
79  
mimic behavior exhibited by the human brain as it faces the task of learning language.
127
 
Second, the simulations are not restricted to language learning; rather, connectionist 
models offer simulations of many other behaviors such as mathematical computation.
128
 
Just as in the language acquisition simulations, these other connectionist models suggest 
many other forms of learning “emerge” out of simple systems with little to no 
prespecified representational knowledge.  
 Therefore, a preliminary conclusion I will draw at this point is to argue that 
Emergentism and Connectionism are two sides of one coin. As described above, while 
the former provides the theoretical description of the process involved in language 
acquisition, the latter offers a model which is analogous to the processing unit involved in 
language learning, thereby simulating what actually goes on during particular aspects of 
learning. Of course, there are plenty of connectionist models that arguably do not 
simulate any kind of emergent features of learning. Likewise, there are opponents to the 
argument I have just marshaled, like Fodor and Pylyshlyn (1988) who argue that 
connectionist models most closely resemble Constructivism, or Quartz (1993), who 
asserts that the models are “nativist in a robust sense.” These objections not only threaten 
the viability of the preliminary claim just made that Emergentism and Connectionism are 
inseparable aspects of a larger picture of language acquisition; they also raise the more 
fundamental question of whether or not talking about language as an “emergent” 
phenomenon is really accurate. If there are interpretations of connectionist simulations 
that go so far as to call them ‘robustly nativist,’ then it seems pertinent to re-examine 
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Connectionism per se, in order to determine the cause of such wildly varying construals.  
I think it is necessary to revisit constraints-representational, architectural, and 
chronotopic-in order to solve this problem. As Elman et al suggest that “innate” applies 
to these constraints, then it seems quite clear that nativist renderings of the simulations 
are going to argue that more constraints are present, while Emergentist interpretations 
will want to say that the constraints are minimal. In particular, representational 
constraints tend to be the most contested, as they are widely denied by Elman and other 
Emergentists. As we shall see in what follows however, there are reasons not to 
wholeheartedly embrace a denial of Representational Nativism. Thus, I will explore this 
opposing account in the final section, seeking once more to pin down an exact meaning 
of “innate” and discussing exactly what we ought to assign to this category when looking 
at Connectionist models.  
 
 
3.5 What have we done with Innateness? 
 In this last section, I am hoping to tie together what appear to be loose and 
unrelated aspects of the nativist versus non-nativist accounts of language acquisition. 
While to be sure, the three chapters above have provided an overview of the major 
contenders in the race for a comprehensive story of language acquisition, I have also, 
along the way, maintained a focus not simply on the arguments put forth by each, but to 
the very terms utilized in defending each particular claim. Most importantly, the term 
“innate” has been examined and its definition, depending on the theory in question, has 
proven to be capricious at best. To recap the rudimentary history of “innateness” sketched 
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thus far, we have added several elements to the neo-rationalists and neo-empiricists, such 
that we now have: 
  
 Contemporary Nativists (Chomsky, Pinker, et al): Something is innate if it 
provides the necessary blueprints for development. All of the principles of 
language are “hardwired” in the mind of the infant at the onset of development, 
and are therefore innately given. Experience merely “flips the switches” in the 
already prespecified language module.  
 
 The “New Wave” of Empiricists (Elman, et al): To be innate simply means to be 
constrained in some way. There can be representational constraints, architectural 
constraints, and timing constraints. Based on neurobiological research and 
connectionist modeling, there is reason to believe that the mind is only 
constrained in its basic architecture (ie-the way in which neural networks are 
ordered, connected to one another, and numbered) However, to claim that specific 
nodes (or neurons) have prespecified weights (representations) is not supported at 
all by neurobiological evidence in favor of the plasticity of the brain. 
Furthermore, connectionist simulations of language acquisition suggest that with 
minimal architectural constraints and no representational constraints, behavior 
that is directly analogous to human behavior nevertheless emerges. 
 
  
 Based on the last two conceptualizations, coupled with the neurobiological 
evidence, there is one component of the term “innate” which seems to be agreed upon, 
and would probably even convince the staunch Empiricists such as Locke. The 
architectural constraints placed on development are innately specified. In the same way 
that for any connectionist model to get off the ground, there must be some 
preprogrammed “set-up” (ie-how many output nodes there are, whether the model is 
recurrent or feed-forward, etc), so too is the brain “designed” in an architecturally 
constrained manner. Certain architectural constraints are often assumed by Emergentists 
to be the only innately specified ‘information’ available to the learner. But this 
characterization has very little cash value when it comes to settling a two thousand year 
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long dispute. The problem remains: For the nativist, not only is the architecture 
prespecified, so too are the representations, but for the non-nativist, in particular the 
Emergentist who utilizes Connectionist simulations as evidentiary support, 
representations need not be innate for something like language learning to take place. In 
fact, claims the Emergentist/Connectionist (henceforth EC), neurobiological data are 
sufficient in number, kind, and relevancy to entirely rule out Representational Nativism 
(RN). Thus, I now turn to one final perspective on the meaning of “innate” in order to 
determine whether or not the proponent of EC has a valid case against RN, or if it is 
nothing more than a straw man attack, based upon a careless equivocation. 
 
3.5.1 Innate Specification versus Intrinsicality  
 
 The argument against RN that Elman et al put forth is based on evidence gleaned 
from neurobiological studies in which the brain is shown to be quite malleable and 
adaptable to change. For example, as was referenced in the second chapter, if auditory 
cortical tissue is transplanted into the visual cortical region early enough in development, 
then the transplanted tissue will actually take on the new role of surrounding visual 
cortices. These sorts of findings suggest that the representational properties of the tissue 
in question change, and are therefore, not innate. 
 However, as Richard Samuels (1998) points out, the case against RN might be 
confounding innately specified properties of cortical tissue with intrinsic properties.
129
 
Most simply put, “intrinsic” refers to any property or characteristic that inheres in 
something independently of the relationships it shares among other things. Prima facie, 
this definition seems more in line with what Chomsky, Pinker, and others have in mind 
                                                 
129
 Samuels (1998), 555. 
83  
when they characterize the principles of grammar as “innate.” It would be a 
misconception nevertheless, to say that Nativists purport that these interactions play no 
role in the development of these interactions. Elman et al characterize a property as being 
“innate” if it has no recourse to information outside the organism,
130
 but Nativists insist 
that it is a necessary condition for acquisition of representations that information from 
“outside the organism,” in the form of environmental interactions, “triggers” the 
representations. They say very little about the learning process itself, but instead, seek to 
explain the initial state, which is comprised of innate representations, but which also 
require environmentally derived information in order for the “switches to be flipped.” 
Thus, “innate,” as it is defined by Elman et al, does not provide an accurate account of 
what Nativists have in mind when using the term. 
 Samuels goes on to suggest that in addition to this initial misrepresentation of RN, 
“there is no reason to suppose that properties cannot be both innately specified and 
extrinsic.”
131
 Properties are extrinsic to an object if the relationships that the object bears 
to other things are at least partially constitutive of those properties.  For instance, it is a 
property of my skin to be on the outside of my musculoskeletal system. This property of 
“being on the outside of” is relational-the relation that my skin bears to my 
musculoskeletal system constitutes this very property-thus, it is extrinsic. This is not to 
say, however, that we can rule out that it is innately specified of my skin that it be on the 
outside of my musculoskeletal system. In fact, it seems quite plausible, at least according 
to this example, that this is both an innately specified and extrinsic property of my skin. 
Assuming that RN implies that representations are intrinsic, therefore, creates a straw 
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man version of Nativism and masks the fact that RN is perfectly consistent with the 
neurobiological evidence cited by Elman et al. As Samuels claims:  
If we adopt Elman et al’s assumption that some neural structures are 
representations (or, at any rate, implement representations), then it should once 
more come as no surprise that altering the inputs to a neural structure or 
transplanting it from one cortical region to another should affect the content of the 
representation. After all, such experimental manipulations may radically alter the 
causal relations that the neural structure bears to other representations that are 
implemented in the brain and, hence, alter the content of the representation. 
[1998, 557]
132
 
 
Another point to consider is the difference between whole organism nativism 
(ON) and tissue nativism. (TN) Samuels thinks that the inference made from neural 
plasticity to the absence of innate representations hinges on a denial of tissue nativism, or 
the thesis that there are representational properties that specific pieces of cortical tissue 
are innately specified to possess.
133
 Organism nativism, on the other hand, claims that 
whole organisms possess innately specified mental representations. More specifically, we 
can say that mental representations are individuated by their contents insofar as there are 
types of representations, BELIEF or COLOR for example, such that all human organisms 
are said to possess tokens of those types.
134
 While it seems clear that the neurobiological 
evidence for neural plasticity rules out the possibility of TN, it is not as apparent that we 
must also reject ON. The assumption made by Elman et al is ~TN and therefore ~RN, but 
again, this appears to be a misinterpretation of RN. Rejecting TN should hardly worry the 
nativist. After all, the claim behind ON is that people, and not individual pieces of tissue, 
                                                 
132
 Samuels rightly notes that Elman et al are not clear about whether we ought to think about 
representations as identical to or implemented by neural structures.  
133
 Ibid, 559 
134
 Adapted from a footnote in Samuels, p 559. Note that where he mentions RED as an innately specified 
type, I have changed this to COLOR, so as not to suggest that RED is a universal innately specified 
representational type.  
85  
possess innately specified concepts.
135
 This is a psychological claim, not a neural one and 
it is therefore easy to imagine that ON true, even if TN is not. 
 We cannot accept this attack against Elman et al wholesale just yet. A point one 
might already have considered is that ON can be true while TN is false only if mental 
entities and mental states are multiply realizable (MR), or, if “tokens of the same type of 
psychological entity can be realized by different kinds of neural entity[s].”
136
 Orignally a 
thesis put forth by Putnam in 1967, philosophers of mind now broadly use MR to argue 
against a strict type-type identity between psychological states and neural states. While it 
might not be innately specified that a specific region of the cortex represent, say, 
BELIEF, it might be innately specified that some region represent this mental state. Thus, 
according to multiple realizability, BELIEF might be implemented by neuron N1 for 
Dan, but by N2 for Tom. Samuels suggests that multiple realizability is “a common 
assumption in contemporary cognitive science,” and that the alternative, a strict type-type 
identity is “widely agreed” to be “implausible.”
137
 It is to this assumption that I now turn. 
 
3.5.2 Considering Multiple Realizability   
 In their paper, Multiple Realizability Revisited,
138
 Bechtel and Mundale suggest 
that the irresistible urge to claim that psychological states are multiply realizable stems 
from the typical philosophical usage of psychological measures to map the brain. More 
specifically, the inconsistency with which these correlative mappings are made might hint 
at a case against MR. Typically, researchers have used a coarse grain to classify mental 
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states as “the same” across individuals and species, while a finer grain is used to 
differentiate among brain states. However, as Bechtel and Mundale note, if we keep the 
grain consistent for both the psychological and the neural classifications, the case for MR 
does not fair so well. A more fine grained mental classification would allow for 
differentiating mental states among individuals or even within the same individual over 
time. Likewise, utilizing this same fine grain to analyze the brain, it is easy to see how 
one could map mental differences onto brain differences and vice versa. It is usually the 
case that in apparent instances of different brain activity failing to produce apparent 
differences in mental states, one has usually just not used a fine enough grain to analyze 
mental states.
139
 Determining the correct grain size however, depends on the context in 
which the comparison is being made.  
Lack of context, Bechtel and Mundale claim, is another reason that MR is so 
widely assumed true. It might be that Lisa and her pet octopus have the same mental 
states, realized by different neural structures, for example, if they are both hungry and 
this hunger is associated with some general food-seeking behavior. However, regarding 
other factors, such as how the food is sought, what food is sought, under what conditions, 
etc, then the food-seeking behavior and its corresponding mental state are different. As 
Bechtel and Mundale rightly point out, asking whether two things are the same or 
different only makes sense with respect to some third thing. If we use different ‘third 
things,’ it is reasonable to assume that Lisa and her octopus have the same mental states, 
but if we consider the context and keep it fixed while doing comparative analysis, both 
                                                 
139
 Bechtel and Mundale, 1999, 177-8. 
87  
psychologically and neurally, then the case for multiple realizability appears dubious at 
best.
140
 
Regardless of whether we want to accept this case against MR,
141
 the point 
remains that MR is not as widely accepted as Samuels assumes. The example above is 
just one among many. Lawrence Shapiro, for instance, makes a similar argument, 
focusing his attack on the Block and Fodor’s argument that a psychological entity is often 
associated with several distinct neurological states.
142
 He claims that in an attempt to 
forge an existence proof for multiple realizability by neural plasticity, the reality of the 
neurobiological evidence is overlooked. The rewiring experiments actually show that the 
rewired rodents do not see exactly the same as normal rodents-i.e. their visual acuity for 
recognizing light gradations is largely impoverished. Furthermore, the auditory cortex of 
a rewired rodent comes to look identical to the visual cortex possessed by its unwired 
friend. Thus, he argues, we have neither a case in which the same function is realized in 
two different ways, nor a case in which the same function is realized in two different 
ways.
143
  
Nevertheless, while Samuels might be overzealous in claiming that multiple 
realizability is the norm, he is correct that at least it is quite a popular account of 
mentality. Furthermore, hemming and hawing over whether or not MR is the case misses 
the point, claims Samuels, as he maintains that it makes no difference if we adopt MR or 
a strict type-type identity thesis about mental states. I don’t think we ought to just accept 
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this argument wholesale however, as I think the difference between the two positions 
does make a difference, namely, a difference between one version of nativism and 
another. Thus, in the following section I will briefly explore Samuel’s attempt and then 
add to it what I take to be an essential point.  
 
3.5.3 Why Ontology Matters 
 The idea that representations can be innately specified even if mental states are 
identical to brain states is illustrated by the following example. Suppose that a piece of 
cortical tissue, call it C1, encodes the representation RED at time t1. C1 is then transferred 
to another region of the brain, such that it no longer encodes RED. Meanwhile, another 
piece of cortex, C2 alters its organization so as to become type-identical to C1 at time t1 
(like the auditory cortices in the rewiring experiments aforementioned). Clearly, it is not 
innately specified of either specific piece of cortex that it encodes RED, and therefore, a 
tissue nativism must be false. However, it may still be true that some piece of cortex 
represents RED, or that the whole organism is innately specified to represent RED. In other 
words, if representations just are brain states, it can still be innately specified of Dan that 
he possess the representation RED. 
 To be sure, this argument is convincing, as I see no problem with assuming that 
mental states can be identical to brain states and yet still be innately specified. In fact, I 
think it can be argued that we must accept that representations can be innately specified if 
we adopt a strict type physicalism. My explanation is this. Imagine that a simple 
representation such as the feeling of hunger is identical to some brain state, call it B1. 
Surely, the brain state which would be identical to “hunger” must be innately specified of 
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a human infant. It seems innately specified of all human infants that they possess 
“hunger.” This particular representation runs us into trouble however, because as soon as 
we say that more than one infant represents the same type, “hunger,” we are flirting with 
multiple realizability once again. It is especially a problem, as Bechtel and Mundale 
pointed out, when we begin talking about octopi as tokening the same type “hunger.” 
This can be easily solved nonetheless, by rephrasing the claim slightly. For instance, we 
can say of each individual person that insofar as they are born with some brain states, 
they must then also be born with some mental states.   
 But the innate representation of hunger is not the best example. It might be argued 
that “hunger” is not a representation at all, but is really just a physical state, in a sort of 
eliminative materialist vein. Thus, if hunger is innately specified, there is still no 
argument for Representational Nativism. Furthermore, “hunger” is not interesting. Even 
the most radical non-nativists are content to say that “hunger” is innate, regardless of 
whether or not it is a mental representation. The real controversy arises naturally, when 
people start claiming that representations such as language are innate.   
So let’s consider another representation, say, a linguistic principle, such as 
ditransitivity. The principle (call it the Rule of Ditransitivity) says that in any clause, if 
the verb valency pattern is ditransitive, then a direct and an indirect object are obligatory. 
For the sake of argument, assume that this principle, or something like it, is represented 
by any speaker of a language whose verbs are both transitive and intransitive. But wait, 
do we really want to say that the representation of the Rule of Ditransitivity is identical to 
some brain state or sequence of brain states? That seems a bit odd, if not absurd. Even if 
we do reduce the mental state of representing the rule to some neural sequence, then is it 
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possible for two people to represent the same rule? Suppose Dan and Tom are both 
discussing verb valency patterns (apparently out of lack of anything better to do), and 
they are effectively communicating to one another facts about the Rule of Ditransitivity. 
Of course, in Dan’s brain, the representation of the rule will be identical to brain states in 
Dan’s brain, and the same for Tom, thus making the representations different. However, 
to suggest that they are not thinking about the same rule is an unfavorable explanation, 
and hence, this is where the proponents of multiple realizability step in and point out the 
flaws in type-physicalism.  
 Of course, multiple realizability is not without its problems, as Shapiro and others 
have rightfully pointed out. Moreover, what sorts of things representations are according 
to MR is neither clear at this point, nor is it obvious that they are the same kinds of things 
as type-physicalism would have them be. The typical MR thesis claims that mental states 
are ‘realized’ by physical states, but not identical to them. Functionalists feed on this 
negative definition and conclude that mental states must simply be functions of the brain, 
and hence, the same types of functions can be realized or represented by many different 
organisms or systems. Difficulties arise however, when the question is posed, just what 
kinds of systems are sufficient to possess certain functional states? Without delving too 
deeply into the abyss of the Artificial Intelligence debate, the claim that only a select 
number of systems can realize complex representations such as language seems relatively 
uncontroversial. The Rule of Ditransitivity, for instance, can be represented by people 
and maybe some connectionist networks, but not by much else, at least not by things like 
my Australian Sheppard or a thermostat. Nevertheless, the typical MR story does not 
clearly define the boundaries whereby we can draw such a distinction. It simply suggests 
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that when things are organized in the right way, they can be conscious. Even more 
puzzling is how Samuels is able to make the assumption that multiple realizability allows 
for representational nativism. The fact that many people can represent the same type of 
belief or linguistic rule entails the possibility that those representations are innately 
specified of the organism. If I were trying to maintain nativism, I would surely opt for the 
ontology that necessitates it, and not the one that only permits its possibility.  
 Based on my discussion so far, it would appear as if we have a dilemma: either 
accept type-physicalism so as to entail nativism, and then face the trouble of explaining 
how representations of things like the Rule of Ditransitivity just are brain states, or take 
the multiple realizability route and all the obscurities that come with it, along with only a 
possibility of nativism. On the other hand, perhaps this is only the appearance of a 
dilemma. The implicit assumption being made here is that type-physicalism and multiple 
realizability are mutually exclusive, and to be sure, this is a commonly held position. But 
what if type-physicalism were true and mental states are multiply realizable? I think such 
an option is not only possible, but is a way to resolve these difficulties, as well as provide 
a powerful argument for representational nativism. 
 In his article, Putnam’s Intuition, Tom Polger discusses four varieties of multiple 
realizability “worth wanting,” in attempts to satisfy this very possibility.
144
 They are as 
follows: 
 1.) Weak-MR: At least some creatures that are not exactly like us in their physical  
composition can be conscious 
 2.) SETI-MR
145
: Some creatures that are significantly different from us in their  
physical composition can be conscious 
 3.) Standard-MR: Systems of indefinitely (perhaps infinitely) many physical  
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compositions can be conscious 
 4.) Radical-MR: Every organized system, regardless of its physical composition,  
can be conscious 
 
According to Polger, the Standard-MR story is hiding behind the mask of Radical-MR, or 
that in nearly all cases, Standard-MR will support Radical-MR.
146
 And just as he is not 
willing to endorse such a wildly unconstrained thesis, neither should we, if we are to 
avoid the supposed dilemma above.  
 If we adopt Weak-MR however, not only does the constraining worry disappear,  
 
but there seems to be no necessity to drop type-physicalism either. As Polger puts it: 
 
“The relationship between mental states of a kind is merely that they are the same 
with respect to those properties characteristic of the kind…Weak-MR is therefore 
no threat to Identity Theory, for it is no problem if some creatures not physically 
identical to us have conscious states, as long as they share some physical 
properties in common with us” [2002, 150]. 
 
In other words, if we go back to Dan and Tom, they are two creatures not exactly alike in 
their physical composition, although they are pretty darn close, but nonetheless, they can 
have the same types of mental states and these mental states can still be identical to brain 
states. Think of it this way: Dan and Tom both represent the Rule of Ditransitivity. Dan’s 
brain realizes this rule by the neural sequence D1…D2, and Tom’s brain realizes it by 
T1…T2. Dan and Tom’s brain states are thus different tokens of the same type, according 
to Weak-MR; that is, they are not identical physically, but they share similar properties. 
Therefore, the mental representations had by Dan and Tom, while identical to the brain 
sequences they are having, are also multiply realized because the mental states 
themselves are also tokens of the same mental type.  
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 Forging this bond between type-identity and Weak-MR thus dissolves the 
problematic nature of positing their mutual exclusivity. We don’t have to think about 
complex representations such as linguistic principles as being unshared, nor does the 
worry about allowing thermostats to represent the Rule of Ditransitivity creep into the 
picture. Furthermore, based on my picture of the type-identity thesis, we must allow for 
at least some innate representations. The moral of the story: ontology does matter. 
 With the consideration of ontology in mind, one further illustration might be 
helpful. The above discussion seems to suggest a need to revise what we mean by 
“representation,” at least as it applies to nativism. Andy Clark suggests for example, that 
we need not think of representations as knowledge of the propositional sort. In a paper 
titled Minimal Rationalism,
147
 he seeks to defend a weak version of nativism and 
illustrates this possibility by way of connectionist models which allow for minimally 
innately specified weights. When weights are pre-set in a network, they represent 
knowledge, but not in the usual “propositionally specifiable kind.” Nevertheless, the pre-
set weights on such a net are “in a real sense informational. It “knows” things which stop 
it from inducing certain conclusions (local minima) from the training data.”
148
 Assuming 
for the sake of argument that these nets are in some way analogous to human learning, we 
have a unique position which straddles rationalism and empiricism. The inductive process 
places the learning closer to empiricism, while the fact that the initial weight 
manipulation needed to avoid the minima is problem specific then places the learning 
back into the space of rationalism. In this “minimal rationalism,” we can speak of 
representations as being innately specified, under the Samuels model of innate 
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specification of an entire organism. The problem has thus shifted from quibbling about 
“innate” to changing what we mean by “representation.” If we accept Clark’s position 
regarding the interpretation of “representation,” it seems that we can take both a nativist 
and non-nativist stance on the acquisition of representations.  
 
Conclusion: Minimal Rationalism +  Language Acquisition = Minimal Nativism 
 Regarding language acquisition, under a minimally rationalist account, I suggest 
that connectionism can provide not only a working model of the way language emerges, 
but also of the way in which it is innate. As Clark suggests, if we have a model whose 
initial weights are set only strongly enough so that the system avoids local minima 
(error), but has no propositionally specified knowledge, it is clear that anything the 
network learns ‘emerges’ through interaction between it and outside stimuli. It is also the 
case however, that it is innately specified of the entire network that its weights be initially 
set, so we know ahead of time some things it will not do (choose a contradiction to the 
XOR problem, for example). Drawing an analogy to human learning, this seems to be at 
least part of what Chomsky and others have in mind when they insist that there are 
certain errors children will not make. Of course, the more robust sense of UG which 
claims that all the principles of grammar exist in the mind of the infant probably will not 
jibe with a Clarkian learning model. After all, the kind of information that is innately 
specified, he says, is non-propositional. Nevertheless, an outright rejection of nativism 
would appear to be hyperbolic.  
 In light of making commensurate what might otherwise be considered two 
contradictory positions on language acquisition, I conclude with two considerations. 
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First, the discussion by Elman, et al and Samuels specifically, and by non-nativists and 
nativists generally, presents a false dilemma with regards to “innate.” and how it figures 
into the story about representations in the mind. The dilemma: either side with Elman et 
al and face the difficulties of responding to the compelling counterarguments, or side 
with the nativists and be forced to prove that mental states are multiply realizable, or even 
worse, as Samuels suggests, if they are not multiply realizable, still insist that 
representations are innate. It turns out that there is a third possibility, insofar as we can 
alter our conception of representation and thus, the dilemma disappears.  
 Second, in developing a position about language acquisition that represents both 
an amalgam of several theories and models, as well as a denial of several of their major 
tenets, I have shown in a sense, that none of these acquisition theories are correct or 
comprehensive on their own accord. While it is true that I have effectively taken what I 
assume to be the strongest points from each, this alternative explanation is indeed not 
identical to UG, UBL, nor Emergentism. This is not to say that I have therefore 
developed an entirely new and systematic theory for language acquisition, but simply, 
that I have forced the reader to reconsider the very terms in use among the dominant 
approaches. By doing so, it is clear that accepting or rejecting one over the other 
wholesale would be a mistake. 
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